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How may we quantify the value of physical resources, such as entangled quantum states, heat baths
or lasers? Existing resource theories give us partial answers; however, these rely on idealizations, like
perfectly independent copies of states or exact knowledge of a quantum state. Here we introduce the
general tool of currencies to quantify realistic descriptions of resources, applicable in experimental
settings when we do not have perfect control over a physical system, when only the neighbourhood
of a state or some of its properties are known, or when there is no obvious way to decompose a
global space into subsystems. Currencies are a set of resources chosen to quantify all others —
like Bell pairs in LOCC or a lifted weight in thermodynamics. We show that from very weak
assumptions on the theory we can already find useful currencies that give us necessary and sufficient
conditions for resource conversion, and we build up more results as we impose further structure. This
work is an application of ‘Resource theories of knowledge’ [1], generalizing axiomatic approaches to
thermodynamic entropy [2–5], work [6] and currencies made of local copies [7, 8].
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INTRODUCTION
Every time you cut your losses, every time you
traded marbles, you used resource theories. They
look at the world and see games, sorting what
is cheap and what is precious, the easy from the
difficult. They are the foundation for every op-
timization problem and every impossibility state-
ment. How so? Resource theories are frameworks
that allow agents to model the world where they
move in a subjective, operational way: they de-
scribe the systems available to the agents, and the
constraints limiting their actions. Using only these
simple ingredients, resource theories enable us to
derive rules for resource transformations — what
agents can do, and how they may act efficiently.
Resource theories can be used to model all kinds
of constraints on the actions of an agent, ranging
from physical laws to technical limitations or even
rules of a game. Because of this, they have proven
successful models in many different contexts, from
physics to computer science and cryptography. For
example, in entanglement theory the resource the-
ory of local operations and classical communica-
tions (LOCC) [9–12] has provided powerful tools
to quantify entanglement. In quantum thermody-
namics, the resource theories of noisy and thermal
operations [13–18] have shed light on irreversibil-
ity and the second law, while resource theories of
asymmetry and reference frames [19–25], coher-
ence [26–30] and quantum control [31] explore the
role of other resources in quantum information the-
ory.
Here we extend the range of applicability of re-
source theories, by showing that we do not need
most of the assumptions of usual approaches in
order to derive useful tools to quantify resources.
A. Quantifying resources
Resource theories start from a set of allowed
transformations that an agent is able to imple-
ment, and derive a structure that encodes which
resources can be converted into which other re-
sources under such transformations. Formally, a
resource theory gives rise to a pre-order → on the
set of resources, i.e. a reflexive and transitive rela-
tion. While this pre-order structure carries all the
information needed to characterize the resource
theory, it is often difficult to compute relevant
properties. For example, it can be hard to de-
cide for any two given resources A and B whether
or not A → B. Similarly, if it is not the case
that A → B, which additional resources would
the agent have to supply in order to generate the
resource B? Or if it is the case that A→ B, what
kind of additional resources could be extracted
along the way?
This is where the concept of assigning value to
resources comes in. The idea is to quantify in a
simple way how much can be done with a partic-
ular resource, and how difficult it is to transform
one resource into another. This concept is hence
central to resource theories: if we can determine a
good characterization of value, then we can answer
important questions in the theory. In equilibrium
thermodynamics, for example, the free energy of
a state quantifies the work that can be extracted
from it, and is also a monotone under isothermal
transformations. More generally, we need more
than one monotone to characterize the structure
of a resource theory.
B. Currencies
Looking at particular resource theories, we can
find a common and powerful tool that is used to
characterize the value of resources in an opera-
tional way. Namely, there is usually a special
class of standard or reference resources that one
can measure or quantify more easily, and that can
be used to determine the value of other resources.
What is more, these special resources are usually
universal in the sense that they allow an agent to
generate any other resource from them. Such re-
sources are then particularly useful to measure the
value of other resources, since we can always con-
vert back and forth between the resources of inter-
est and the universal reference resources. We call
such reference resources a currency—they provide
a natural operational interpretation of value.
In real life, for instance, money constitutes a
currency, since we can use it to trade against essen-
tially any resource. For a more physical example,
note that we can also identify a currency in two-
party LOCC: maximally entangled pairs of qubits
(Bell pairs) can be used to teleport half of any
quantum state [9], and so the value of resources
like bipartite states can be defined in terms of how
many Bell pairs are needed to create, or how many
can be extracted from, a resource. These consid-
erations yield the well-known concepts of entan-
glement of formation and distillable entanglement.
Similarly, work in traditional thermodynamics can
be considered a currency that allows to implement
essentially any transformation if given enough of
it. Finally, the concept of currencies is also under-
lying the ideas in Lieb and Yngvason’s approach
to defining entropy in thermodynamics [2–5], fol-
lowing earlier axiomatic work on thermodynam-
ics [32, 33]; there, the set of equilibrium states
forms a currency.
Now, if a resource theory has a currency, we can
use it to find necessary and sufficient conditions for
resource transformations. For instance, if the yield
of “selling” the initial resource is larger than the
cost of creating the final one, then the transforma-
tion is possible: we simply sell the initial resource
and use some of the coins to buy the final one. In
addition, the cost and yield of resources are also
monotones on the pre-order → of the theory. As
they have to be decreasing along the pre-order,
this yields additional necessary conditions for re-
source transformations. For a further discussion
on monotones and their connection to currencies,
see Appendix D.
C. Previous approaches
While currencies serve the same purpose in
many resource theories, they are built on a num-
ber of different assumptions. For example, Bell
pairs in LOCC rely on the concept of copies of
many resources, while work in (quantum) thermo-
dynamics can be modelled as a pure state on an
energy ladder, often satisfying a requirement of
translational invariance [34–37]. In contrast, the
currency or “reference states” in the axiomatic ap-
proach to thermodynamics of Refs. [2–5] satisfy
special comparability and scalability properties.
But which assumptions are essential to guar-
anteeing necessary or sufficient conditions for re-
source transformations? Which assumptions do
we need in order to characterize the cost of trans-
formations? In this work, we will take a more ab-
stract view on currencies and discuss more pre-
cisely which properties allow us to make which
particular statements. Preceding this article, there
has been some work towards abstract characteri-
zations of resource theories and common tools like
monotones and conversion rates therein [7, 8, 38].
However, these works and the very concepts they
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seek to describe rely on idealizations such as ex-
act knowledge of the state on the relevant systems
and complete absence of correlations between sub-
systems, which cannot always be guaranteed in
practice. In quantum theory, exact and perfectly
uncorrelated states are the equivalent of spheri-
cal cows in a vacuum: idealizations that ease the
maths but cannot be implemented in the lab (for
example, it is impossible to control the conditions
of an experiment so well as to claim that a quan-
tum system is in a given pure state with probabil-
ity one). Indeed, such abstractions may be of little
use to experimentalists wanting to apply a physical
theory to the resources at hand. To be relevant,
resource theories must realistically model the lim-
itations of real agents, both in their descriptions
of resources and in the constraints in action [39].
In Ref. [1] we have developed a general frame-
work for resource theories that allows us to over-
come these issues, but we left the question open
as to whether it is possible to recover the useful
tools of traditional resource theories without all
the handy simplifications.
D. Contribution of this work
In Section I we provide an abstract characteri-
zation of currencies and identify minimal key as-
sumptions needed to derive useful notions of value
of resources and transformations. We show that
we can make relevant statements without many of
the properties that are taken for granted in other
works.
In Section II we use the framework of Ref. [1] to
apply these tools to general general settings where
we may not have a known subsystem structure, a
composition operation or a precise description of
resources. This paves the way to studying cur-
rencies that are themselves made up of more gen-
eral resources, such as approximate Bell pairs or
systems where slight correlations cannot be ruled
out, and that lack properties like scalability as as-
sumed in [2–5]. Then we present a concrete appli-
cation of our tools to the resource theory of uni-
tal maps, where we quantify the cost, yield and
balance for general resources and transformations.
These quantities correspond to notions of entropy
for specifications, and yield direct results for the
questions of work extraction and transformation
balance for general resources.
I. TYPES OF CURRENCIES
We split this discussion into three stages, start-
ing from a basic definition of currencies and adding
in stronger conditions as we progress. We outline
the properties and results that follow from the as-
sumptions made up to each stage. Technical def-
initions, statements and proofs can be found in
Appendix A.
A. Stage I: a universal standard
At a basic level, currencies have two defining
properties: order and universality for a given tar-
get. We show that such a basic notion of curren-
cies already allows for a definition of cost and yield
of all resources, from which we may derive neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for general resource
transformations.
1. Ordered set and value
We have argued above that currencies are a col-
lection of ‘standard’ or ‘reference’ resources rela-
tive to which we can quantify other resources. For-
mally, we can define a currency as a subset C of
resources equipped with a well-defined value func-
tion Val : C → R+ that satisfies
C → C′ ⇐⇒ Val(C) ≥ Val(C′),
for all currencies C,C′ ∈ C.1 In particular, the set
C of currency resources must be totally ordered,
up to equivalences (e.g. two different Bell states
have the same value under LOCC, and in general
C ⇋ C′ ⇐⇒ Val(C) = Val(C′)). This condition
guarantees that a currency of high value is really
strictly more powerful than one with a lower value
(Proposition A.3).
While this may seem like a strong requirement
at first, we observe that essentially all of the ex-
amples of currencies we find in resource theories
satisfy this order requirement. Our order condi-
tion is also not unusual: it is in fact reminiscent
of the comparability requirement in axiomatic ap-
proaches to thermodynamics [2–5, 33], where it
is demanded for the set of reference states (‘equi-
librium states’ or ‘entropy meter’). Finally, note
that we can always start from the whole pre-order
structure of the resource theory and build a cur-
rency by selecting a maximal subset of resources
that is totally ordered (plus equivalences); any
monotone function to R+ on this set is a valid
value function.
1 We consider functions to the positive real numbers —
we assume the currency to have a finite least valuable
resource, a bottom (largely motivated by the framework
of [1], where it corresponds to ‘knowing nothing’). Neg-
ative values can then be eliminated without loss of gen-
erality through an additive constant.
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2. Universality
We have mentioned that a currency is typically
universal in the sense that any resource can be
generated from the currency if given enough of it,
and any resource can be “sold” for some currency
resource (which could however be of zero value).
While we usually find that this holds for all re-
sources, we relax this condition slightly to hold for
a target set S of resources. Formally, we can then
write the property of universality as follows: for
any resource A in a target set S, there is a cur-
rency resource C ∈ C such that C → A and a
currency resource C′ ∈ C such that A→ C′.
In the axiomatic approach to thermodynamics
of [4], this property corresponds to an extended
comparability axiom for states out of thermody-
namic equilibrium with equilibrium states.
3. Cost and yield of resources
Order and universality of a currency allow us
to define the cost and yield of any target resource
A ∈ S:
Cost (A)C = infC∈C
(ValC : C → A)
Yield (A)C = sup
C′∈C
(ValC′ : A→ C′).
The cost and yield of resources are monotones —
and so we immediately obtain the following neces-
sary conditions for resource transformations in the
target S (Theorem 1):
A→ B =⇒ Cost (A)C ≥ Cost (B)C ,
A→ B =⇒ Yield (A)C ≥ Yield (B)C .
We also get a sufficient condition based on the cost
and yield of resources:
Yield (A)C > Cost (B)C =⇒ A→ B.
These conditions correspond to the necessary and
sufficient conditions obtained in [4] for thermody-
namics.
4. Tight currencies
For any resource A in the target, we can show
(Proposition A.5) that
Cost (A)C ≥ Yield (A)C .
We can then look at the special case when the
cost and the yield of a resource A are equal,
Cost (A)C = Yield (A)C . When they are further-
more achievable by a currency resource C, that is,
when both C → A and A → C for some C ∈ C,
we call the currency tight for the resource A. We
will then also denote the set of such resources for
which the currency is tight by S=.
We show in Theorem 2 that for the set S=, the
currency in fact gives a simple necessary and suf-
ficient condition for resource transformations,
A→ B ⇐⇒ Cost (A)C ≥ Cost (B)C
when A,B ∈ S= (and of course similarly for the
yield). This then also means that on the set S=,
the resource theory provides a full order (up to
equivalences). In particular, currency resources
are also in S= if they are in the target, and in
turn, resources in S= could always be added to
the currency without changing the theory.
Note that most quantum resource theories do
not have a known tight currency for the whole tar-
get (that would have made things too easy). How-
ever, an example for tightness is given by the re-
source theory of noisy operations (or unital maps)
when restricting to uniform states on some sup-
port (that is, states for which all non-zero eigen-
values are equal) [40]. Similarly, assuming that
any state transformation in macroscopic thermo-
dynamics can be implemented reversibly, work in
equilibrium thermodynamics can be considered a
tight currency [2, 3, 5].
B. Stage II: independent currency
In addition to defining the cost and yield mono-
tones on resources, it would be useful to use the
currency to determine the balance of general re-
source transformations: if resource A is more valu-
able than B, how much currency can be extracted
in the process A → B? Or how much currency
needs to be supplied to transform B into A?
1. Independence between currency and target
In order to answer these questions and formu-
late concepts such as “adding a currency C to a
resource A”, we need to introduce a notion of com-
posing resources. For now we represent an arbi-
trary notion of composition simply as (A,C); in
Section II we show that there is always a natural
way to formalize it. It is also essential to be able
to address the currency and the target resources
independently. For this it might help to think that
we keep the currency in an independent wallet, but
we will see that this notion is more general in in
Section II.
In quantum theory, for example, this is guar-
anteed if the currency and the target resources
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live in different subsystems and are composed in
tensor product, and the allowed transformations
in the theory allow us to address their respective
degrees of freedom individually. In real life, this
independence is not a given, and is often an ap-
proximation: for example, in an optics experiment
we might not be able to individually address an
atom or transition without slightly disturbing the
others.
We can formulate the independence condition as
C → C′ =⇒ (A,C)→ (A,C′)
for all target resources A and currencies C. This
condition guarantees that a higher valued cur-
rency resource is really more powerful than a lower
valued one in facilitating state transformations
(Proposition A.8). In Section II we show how to
apply this conditions to realistic settings, where
for example slight correlations between target and
currency cannot be ruled out.
2. Balance of resource conversions
Composition of resources allows us to define the
balance of a transformation from resource A to re-
source B in the target, conditioned on available
currency C as
Balance(A→ B|C)C
= sup
C′∈C
(Val(C′)−Val(C) : (A,C)→ (B,C′)).
In particular, if the balance is negative, it corre-
sponds to minimal cost of transforming A into B
given access to a currency C. Of course, this quan-
tity is only defined if the value of C is actually
large enough to afford the transformation. The in-
dependence condition ensures that the balance is
meaningful, because it guarantees that the value
of currencies is connected to how helpful they are
at facilitating transitions in the target (Proposi-
tion A.8).2
Note that in general this definition will depend
on the available currency resource C at the start
of the transaction. This dependency could in prin-
ciple be arbitrary: on the one hand, having access
to additional currency in the wallet might facil-
itate the transformation and act partially like a
catalyst, such that the balance of a transformation
becomes larger the more currency is used to imple-
ment the transformation. In real life, for example,
2 The symmetric independence condition A → B =⇒
(A,C) → (B, C) would guarantee that A → B =⇒
Balance(A → B|C)C ≥ 0, but does not seem to have a
big impact otherwise.
a client with more money may receive a special
discount for a transaction (e.g. offered in the hope
of acquiring a returning, rich loyal customer). On
the other hand, however, having additional money
might occasionally make the transaction more ex-
pensive: if instead of paying the exact amount of
coins, one tries to pay with a larger note, one might
end up paying more for an object or service (e.g.
if the selling party cannot give change).
As a last remark, note that we could have de-
fined an analogous notion of balance,
Balance∗(A→ B|C)
= sup
C′∈C
(Val(C)−Val(C′) : (A,C′)→ (B,C)),
where instead of conditioning on a starting re-
source C in the currency, we demand that a final
resource C is reached at the end of the transfor-
mation. While we work with the first definition of
balance in this paper, all the results could also be
formulated with respect to this adapted notion.
C. Stage III: fair currency
In Stage II, the balance of a resource transfor-
mation can in principle depend on the available
currency C in the wallet. If that is not the case,
we say that the currency is fair, a property com-
posed of two aspects. On the one hand, it implies
that there are no discounts for the poor, colloqui-
ally speaking: a transformation does not become
cheaper to implement just because one has less
available currency. On the other hand, having ac-
cess to more currency does not make a transforma-
tion cheaper either — in other words, the currency
does not act as a catalyst. We analyse the two con-
ditions and their implications separately. In both
cases the starting point is the same: suppose that
we have resources A and B in the target, and we
can perform the transformation
(A,C1)→ (B,C2)
for some currency C1, C2 ∈ C, with
∆ := Val(C2)− Val(C1).
We will now see what may happen if we start from
a different currency C3.
1. Having less does not help
Fairness in this direction means that if C3 is
more valuable than C1, we can always find a fi-
nal C4 ∈ C with the same difference Val(C4) −
Val(C3) = ∆ that achieves the transformation
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(A,C3) → (B,C4) (and vice-versa: we can first
fix C4 with ValC4 ≥ ValC2 and look for an ap-
propriate C3).
3
Naturally, this condition implies that the bal-
ance of a transformation cannot decrease given ac-
cess to more currency, that is (Proposition A.11),
ValC ≥ ValC′
=⇒ Balance(A→ B|C)C ≥ Balance(A→ B|C′)C ,
In many familiar resource theories, currency re-
sources can be composed to yield resources of
higher value, such as an increasing number of Bell
pairs in LOCC or a higher number of coins in real
life. When these individual resources can be acted
upon without disturbing the others, we can always
ignore some of the currency and bring it back af-
ter the transaction. In these cases, more currency
can never make a transaction more expensive; if
anything, it can be cheaper when having access
to more. Formally, what guarantees fairness in
this direction in such cases is a condition of in-
dependence, like the one we introduced between
currency and target, but extended to individual
subsystems within the currency. For example, this
is implied when currency resources are seen as a
collection of objects in the paradigm of symmetric
monoidal categories (one can understand copies of
Bell pairs in LOCC as an example, see e.g. [8]). 4
In resource-theoretical approaches to macro and
microscopic thermodynamics we also find this con-
dition: it is expressed through the composition ax-
iom in Ref. [4], and is assumed in some models for
quantum thermodynamics where work is stored in
pure states on a number of individual qubits [41].
In fact, because this assumption is so common in
resource theories, it is rarely questioned or exposed
in this way. However, we would like to work with
more general currencies than tensor product copies
of individual states, and so we make this aspect of
fairness explicit.
2. Having more does not help
Fairness in the other direction means that if the
initial currency C3 is less valuable than C1, we can
3 This condition is required to hold within suitable bounds,
so that we do not hit the top boundary of the currency
(if it exists), that is Val(C3) < supC∈C ValC −∆ .
4 Then, transformations are defined on individual objects
and when two objects A,B are composed, local trans-
formations f, g can also be combined and applied to the
composed object such that (f(A), g(B)) = (f, g)(A,B)
(see e.g. [7]). Choosing one of the functions as the iden-
tity, this ensures that we can put extra currency on the
side for the purpose of a transformation and re-introduce
it again later.
again always find a C4 ∈ C with the same differ-
ence Val(C4)−Val(C3) = Val(C2)−Val(C1) that
achieves the transformation (A,C3) → (B,C4)
(and also vice-versa: we can first fix C4 with
ValC4 ≤ ValC2 and look for an appropriate C3).5
Naturally, this condition implies that the bal-
ance of a transformation cannot increase given ac-
cess to more currency, that is (Proposition A.12),
ValC ≤ ValC′
=⇒ Balance(A→ B|C)C ≥ Balance(A→ B|C′)C .
Operationally, this direction of fairness makes
sure that transformations are not easier to imple-
ment just because one has access to more currency
— that is, the currency does not act like a catalyst.
This would be guaranteed for example in a theory
in which one is always able to ‘borrow’ extra cur-
rency for free. Since this is in general not the case
(for example due to finite-size effects), fairness in
this direction is more common to fail than in the
other.
3. Both directions
In case fairness holds in both directions, it fol-
lows that the balance of a transition does not de-
pend on the initial currency C,
Balance(A→ B|C)C = Balance(A→ B|C′)C
=: Balance(A→ B)C
for any C,C′ within suitable boundaries (Proposi-
tion A.13).
For this new single notion of balance, we can
also show that (Theorem 4)
Balance(A→ B)C & Yield (A)C − Cost (B)C .
For resources A,B for which C is tight, further-
more
Balance(A→ B)C = Yield (A)C − Cost (B)C .
In many familiar resource theories in physics,
fairness of the currency is either taken for granted
or imposed as a fundamental restriction on good
currencies. In thermodynamics, for example, it
appears under the name of translational invari-
ance: transformations are not allowed to depend
on the initial state of the energy storage sys-
tem [5, 34–37]. These storage systems are mod-
eled as harmonic oscillators that mimic a classical
5 Here, we assume that Val(C3) ≥ Val(C1) − Val(C2) so
that we can actually afford the transformation with C3.
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weight; work, or the balance of a transformation,
is counted as the the difference between the en-
ergy of initial and final states. The underlying
assumption required is that the weight system has
many evenly spread energy levels and is far from
the ground state.
D. Pathological cases
For Stage I currencies, we have seen that all
resources A in the target satisfy Cost (A)C ≤
Yield (A)C . We can read this as an impossibil-
ity statement that says that we cannot increase
the amount of currency for free in the process of
buying and re-selling a resource A — this would
collapse the order in the currency and render the
theory trivial. In a Stage II currency, there might
however exist resources for which Balance(A →
A|C)C > 0 for some C ∈ C, that is, resources A
which allow us to generate a little bit of currency
for free if we have access to A and some particular
value C in the currency. Then, A would essentially
act like a catalyst in a process on the currency that
is otherwise forbidden.
The existence of such a resource A does not
make the theory trivial because the condition
Balance(A → A|C)C > 0 depends on the exact
currency C we start with. For example, it could
require a valuable currency resource C, or could
hold only for a very expensive resource A that is
hard to buy in the first place. In real life, for ex-
ample, a house that is rented to a reliable tenant
generates rent money every month, but requires
a large investment to start with. However, if the
currency is fair (in the direction that more does
not help), we can show that such a pathological
resource would again collapse the order in the cur-
rency. Pathological cases are discussed in detail in
Appendix C.
II. APPLICATION TO REALISTIC
RESOURCES
Now we show how to apply those ideas to ex-
plicit descriptions of arbitrary physical resources.
The following approach allows us to model ap-
proximate transformations and generalize the idea
of composition to a natural concept that applies
for example when correlations between subsystems
cannot be excluded, or when the subsystem struc-
ture is not clear. For details on this framework,
we refer to Ref. [1]; for the purposes of this work
the following summary will suffice.
A. Setup for resource theories
1. Realistic descriptions of resources
We may see the state space Ω of a theory as the
language that an agent uses to describe resources:
for example, in quantum theory Ω could be the
set of all density operators over a global Hilbert
space; in traditional thermodynamics the set of all
distinguishable macrostates. Realistically, agents
may not know the exact state of a system, and may
instead describe resources through more coarse de-
scriptions, like the ε-neighbourhood of a state (ob-
tained after tomography) or the specification of
a few measurement outcomes. Such specifications
are simply subsets of the state space, like Bε(ρ),
composed of all states that are compatible with
the agent’s knowledge. Specifications have a natu-
ral partial order: if a description V is more specific
than another, W , we simply have V ⊆ W , for ex-
ample Bε(ρ) ⊆ Bε+δ(ρ). Together, the subsets of
Ω form the specification space SΩ — the space of
realistic resources.
2. Transformations
Physical actions implemented by an agent trans-
form resources into resources (f : SΩ → SΩ), in
such a way that if an agent is unsure about the un-
derlying state, this uncertainty carries through the
transformation. For example, if the agent knows
that the state of a system is either ρ or σ, then
after applying a transformation f , her knowledge
is updated as f({ρ}) ∪ f({σ}). In general, trans-
formations f ∈ T need to act element-wise, that
is for any specification V ⊆ Ω,
f(V ) =
⋃
ν∈V
f({ν}).
This formalism also allows us to model cases where
there is uncertainty about the exact effect of a
transformation: for example, after performing pro-
cess tomography of an experimental procedure f ,
we may learn only that f is in a neighbourhood of a
trace preserving completely positive (TPCP) map
g. We could model this procedure as f : {ρ} 7→
Bε(g(ρ)).
3. Resource theories
As discussed in the introduction, a resource the-
ory is defined by a set T of allowed transformations
available to the agent, which act on the space of
resources — the specification space SΩ that de-
scribes the resources from the point of view of an
7
agent. The set of allowed transformations induces
a pre-order → of accessibility on SΩ, which en-
codes whether or not a resource V ∈ SΩ can be
transformed into another resource W . Formally,
V →W ⇐⇒ ∃f ∈ T s.t. f(V ) ⊆W.
This pre-order combines the action of the trans-
formation and the natural partial order on sets:
operationally, this means that forgetting informa-
tion (going to a less specific description) is al-
ways allowed in the resource theory. For ex-
ample, in a resource theory of unital maps6 on
qubits we would find that we can always reach the
specification of an ε−neighbourhood of the max-
imally mixed state: {|0〉〈0|} → Bε(12/2), since
there is a transformation f ∈ T that achieves
f({|0〉〈0|}) = {12/2} and the maximally mixed
state is a more specific description than an ε-ball
around it, {12/2} ⊆ Bε(12/2).
B. Insights
Let us now introduce the main insights that this
approach brings into the subject of quantifying re-
sources. In Section I we saw that both currencies
and the target are sets of resources. In our formal-
ism, this means that they are sets of specifications,
C,S ⊆ SΩ. In the following we explore some ex-
amples. Formal definitions, results and proofs can
be found in Appendix A.
1. Rough currencies and single-shot statements
Specifications are particularly useful when a the-
ory has a known currency Cideal that cannot be im-
plemented experimentally — it may rely on ideal-
izations like pure or perfectly uncorrelated states,
for example. The experimenter may instead have
access to coarser specifications of resources, for
example ε-neighbourhoods of the currency states
Creal = {Bε(ρ)}ρ∈Cideal . If Creal is ordered (up to
equivalences), it automatically forms a currency
for some target space. Otherwise (for example, if
two elements overlap too much), we may remove or
replace some of the elements with other accessible
resources until we obtain an ordered set. Natu-
rally, we would not expect Creal to be as powerful
a currency as Cideal: it might not reach the entire
state space (e.g. because we do not have access to
6 Unital maps are all TPCP maps that preserve the iden-
tity, E(1) = 1. See Section IIC for more details on the
resource theory of unital maps and on how our results
apply to this theory
pure states), or it might offer a coarser quantifi-
cation (because we removed some elements). Nev-
ertheless, we can always identify a maximal tar-
get set of specifications for which Creal is univer-
sal. In this case the target would include the set
of ε-neighbourhoods of all states reached by Cideal
(if the theory is stable, e.g. linear, under these
neighbourhoods, as explained in [1, Section V]).
Once we find the appropriate target for Creal, we
may use all the tools of currencies, like cost, yield
and checking for fairness, which apply to transfor-
mations between specifications, not only between
states.
We can also address questions about single-shot
transformations, of the sort ‘what is the cost of
reaching a final state, if we allow for a small error
tolerance?’ The agent encodes that error toler-
ance in an operational notion of closeness on the
state space (like the trace distance), and uses it
to build specifications of ε-balls, V ε ⊇ V [1, Sec-
tion V]. It follows that Cost (V )C ≥ Cost (V ε)C
and Yield (V )C ≥ Yield (V ε)C . The exact result
will depend on the theory [12, 42]; in the upcom-
ing example of unital maps, the cost is character-
ized by smooth entropy measures. Similarly, with
a Stage II currency we can talk about the bal-
ance of transitions between two resources V ε and
W ε. The same reasoning applies to any currency
and target made of arbitrary specifications of re-
sources more generally than just for well-behaved
ε-neighbourhoods.
2. Local resources and currencies
In our approach we start from a global theory
and model local resources as specifications in a
global space. Doing this allows us to go beyond the
tensor product to combine local resources. For ex-
ample, given a Hilbert space HA⊗HB, a marginal
state ρA is a compact description of the set of all
global states compatible with that marginal,
ρ̂A := {σAB : TrB(σAB) = ρA}.
A general way to compose local resources is to
combine these specifications, for example
ρ̂A ∩ τ̂B = {σAB : σA = ρA ∧ σB = τB}.
This way, we can treat genuinely local knowledge
without imposing additional non-local assump-
tions — for example, we do not assume that the
local states in the product state ρA⊗τB ∈ ρ̂A∩ τ̂B .
If we do have some additional knowledge about the
strength of correlations, we can include it in the
specification. For example, the knowledge that the
mutual information between the two subsystems is
at most ε can be expressed as a specification
I(A : B)≤ε := {σAB : I(A : B)σ ≤ ε},
8
and our global specification then becomes
ρ̂A ∩ τ̂B ∩ I(A : B)≤ε.
Often a currency C and a target S consist of local
resources lying in different subsystems. Consider
for example the case of LOCC, where a standard
currency consists of different numbers of copies of
Bell pairs. These can be stored in a wallet system
shared by two agents Alice and Bob: we may think
of a decomposition of the global Hilbert space as
Hglobal =
(
N⊗
i=1
(Ai ⊗Bi)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
wallet
⊗A′ ⊗ B˜′︸ ︷︷ ︸
target
,
where each Ai and Bi is a qubit. The currency
is made of specifications of a certain number n of
copies of Bell pairs in the wallet, C = {Ψn}Nn=1,
with Ψn = {σglobal : σA1B1...AnBn = |ψ〉〈ψ|⊗n},
and |ψ〉 = (|00〉+|11〉)/√2. Note that the currency
is naturally ordered as Ψn → Ψm for n > m (as
Ψn ⊂ Ψm, that is we can always go from more to
less Bell pairs by forgetting some— in other words,
by discarding or tracing them out). Teleportation
implies that this currency is universal for a target
as large as the wallet, log(max(|A′|, |B′|)) ≤ N .
In our language it means that we can pick the
target S to be any set of specifications that are
local in A′ ⊗ B′, for example S = {ρ̂A′B′}ρ, with
ρ̂A′B′ = {σglobal : σA′B′ = ρA′B′} (Appendix B).
The cost and yield of target resources are the usual
entanglement of formation and distillation, respec-
tively [12].
3. Independence without composition
We promised that specifications allow us to de-
fine independence between a currency and a target
without the need to talk of subsystems or any tra-
ditional notion of composition. At heart, indepen-
dence means that we can change one quantity (the
currency) without affecting the other (the target),
as discussed in Section I. While this trivially holds
in the neat case of a tensor product structure be-
tween states and subsystems, the notion is more
general.
The first requirement for independence was that
all states of the currency can coexist with all states
of the target — that is, if we combine the knowl-
edge C about the currency and the knowledge V
about the target, the resulting specification C ∩V
contains at least one global state compatible with
this knowledge. If on the other hand C ∩ V = ∅,
this tells us that the two specifications contained
contradictory knowledge — which could happen
for example if currency and target were defined
on the same degree of freedom, so we could not
have both at once. Therefore, the first condition
for Stage II currencies is compatibility: for all cur-
rency and target resources C ∈ C and V ∈ S, we
should have C ∩ V 6= ∅. We do not impose any
extra subsystem structure on C and S, which are
otherwise just sets of specifications, nor do we re-
quire a formal operation of composition of ‘local’
resources.
The second key idea is that we can manipulate
the currency without disturbing the target. In our
language, this means that if we can transform C →
C′, then we can also act on the combined knowl-
edge of currency and target as C ∩ V → C′ ∩ V ,
for all target resources V ∈ S. Naturally, the Bell
pairs from the previous example form a Stage II
currency (Proposition B.1). Another example of a
stage II currency is work in quantum thermody-
namics (Proposition B.2). More generally, these
conditions can be satisfied even when correlations
between currency and target cannot be ruled out
— in quantum theory, they do not need to be in
a tensor product. Indeed, local knowledge such as
ρ̂A ∩ σ̂B is sufficient to ensure independence, and
therefore to define the balance of transformations
[1, Section IV].
C. Example: unital maps
Let us look at the particular example of a re-
source theory in which the allowed operations are
given by unital, completely positive trace pre-
serving maps on quantum states [43]. On the
level of state transformations and for classical
systems, this resource theory also coincides with
the resource theory of noisy operations7 [14, 42–
45]. As such, it characterizes a range of physi-
cal situations from an agent processing informa-
tion in a noisy environment to thermodynamics
on degenerate energy eigenstates. On the level of
quantum state transformations, the resource the-
ory of unital maps is well understood: the pre-
order on quantum states is given by majoriza-
tion8 [14, 42, 45–57], and we can quantify resources
through smooth entropies [40, 42, 58–62].
However, for specifications the situation is not
so clear: how can we assign value to general re-
sources V ∈ SΩ? Are there simple necessary
and sufficient conditions for resource transforma-
tions V → W? Solving these questions would
7 The actual set of unital maps is a superset of the maps
achievable by noisy operations.
8 For simplicity, we restrict our analysis to the case of same
input and output dimensions.
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allow us to characterize the pre-order for realis-
tic descriptions of resources, including approxi-
mations around quantum states and specifications
of a few selected properties of the system. Fur-
thermore, it would give us insight into how to
define entropy of specifications, study how much
work is needed to erase the information encoded
in a specification (analogous to Landauer’s princi-
ple [42, 63, 64]), and how to draw a link between
microscopic and macroscopic thermodynamics, as
outlined in Ref. [1]. Finally, the question of when
a specification can be transformed into another
bears resemblance to the question of the work cost
of a general process [42] as well as to the question
of when a set of states can be transformed into
another set [65–68].
Here we introduce three alternative currencies
for the resource theory of unital maps on specifica-
tions. First we define a Stage I currency and com-
pute the cost and yield of specifications, which al-
ready give us necessarily and sufficient conditions
for resource transformations. Then we give a sim-
ilar Stage II currency, and discuss examples of al-
ternative currencies that make use of specifications
more explicitly. Finally, we study smooth transfor-
mations between ε-neighbourhoods of states. Our
choice of currency is inspired by Ref. [40], where
entropies for quantum states were derived from
similar considerations — our results in this sec-
tion could hence be interpreted as a step towards
understanding entropies for specifications.
1. Stage I currency
Let the global state space Ω of the theory be all
quantum states on a d-dimensional Hilbert space.
Specifications V ∈ SΩ are then sets of such states.
We can define a universal currency C = {Ck}dk=1∪
{Ω} as the set of uniform states of different ranks,
Ck =
{
1
k
k∑
i=1
|i〉〈i|
}
=
{
Πk
k
}
,
where Πk denotes the projector onto the first k
eigenstates of a fixed basis. We take the value
function
Val
(
Ck
)
= log(d)− log k,
such that states with lower rank are more valu-
able.9 We prove that C indeed forms a currency
for the global target S = SΩ in Proposition B.3.
9 Note that Val(Ω) = Val(Cd) = 0, since the two are in-
terconvertible under unital operations.
The cost of a specification V in terms of C is then
given by
Cost (V )C = log d− sup
ρ∈V
log⌊2Hmin(ρ)⌋
where Hmin is the min-entropy [60, 62, 69] de-
fined as Hmin(ρ) = − logλmax(ρ), with λmax(ρ)
being the largest eigenvalue of ρ, and ⌊·⌋ the near-
est integer (from below) to the enclosed expression
(Proposition B.4). This result can be seen as an
analogue to the lower bound for entropy of quan-
tum states ρ found in Ref. [40], which obtained
exactly Hmin(ρ) as a monotone. Here, we see that
more generally there is an optimization over the
states in the specification.
Note that as we evaluate the cost, we need to
round down λ−1max(ρ), because there is a limit to
how well we can approximate λmax by means of
a rational 1n . For example, in a two-level sys-
tem, our currency would only contain elements
of two different values: 1 (pure state), and 0
(fully mixed state). Then, the cost of a single-
qubit specification is either 0 (for all specifica-
tions containing the fully mixed state) or 1 (for
all others), but nothing in between. This is a
finite-size effect that is not critical for large sys-
tems; it nevertheless tells us that our choice of
currency, while universal, is not very fine-grained.
An alternative currency for single qubits could
be for example C′ = {Cp}1/2p=0 ∪ {Ω}, with Cp =
{p |0〉〈0| + (1 − p) |1〉〈1|}, which would recover
Cost(V )C′ = log d− supρ∈V Hmin(ρ).10
As for the yield of specifications in terms of
C, let us first look at the single-qubit example.
Suppose that we start from the specification V =
{|0〉〈0|, |1〉〈1|}. While for any individual pure state
the yield is 1 since we can always generate the pure
currency state from it, the same is not true for the
specification V . The reason is that there is no sin-
gle protocol that achieves the pure currency state
for both states |0〉〈0| and |1〉〈1|, so that it could
be applied without knowing which one is actually
the case. Instead, in the case of V one can only
generate the fully mixed currency state, which can
be done with a single process that works for both
cases (the discard-and-prepare map E(ρ) = 1/2,
10 In Ref. [40], this issue was circumvented by extending
the state space from density matrices to continuous step
functions. On the level of state transformations, the the-
ory of unital maps (or noisy operations) boils down to
a simple majorization condition, which can easily be ex-
tended to such step functions. However, here we would
like to be a little more careful, especially since we deal
with specifications V in general, for which the pre-order
structure is more complicated and not fully characterized
by majorization.
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which is unital). The yield of V is hence 0 — the
same as the yield for a general convex mixture of
the two pure states in V .
In general, we find that the yield of a specifica-
tion in terms of C is given by
Yield (V )C = log d− max
ρ∈V P
H0(ρ),
where V P denotes the convex hull of V , which
consists of all the convex (probabilistic) mixtures
of the states in V [1, Section VI]) and H0(ρ) is
the order zero quantum Re´nyi entropy defined as
H0(ρ) = log rank(ρ) [60, 62, 69]. This is proven in
Proposition B.5.
2. Stage II currency
We can now analyse an independent currency
that lives in a different subsystem to the target
specifications. Consider a global state space of
density matrices on two systems W ⊗S, where W
will be our wallet and system S the target, with
dimensions dW ≥ dS . More precisely, we can show
that the set C = {Ck}dWk=1 ∪ {Ω}, with
Ck =
{
σWS : TrS(σWS) =
Πk
k
}
forms a currency for the target S defined through
V ∈ S ⇐⇒ V = {σWS : TrC(σWS) ∈ VS}
for some set VS of density matrices on system S
(Proposition B.6). This currency furthermore sat-
isfies independence according to Definition A.7,
even if most elements of the currency are not in
a tensor product with target resources.
We can easily see that the currency is not fair,
because of the finite-size effects discussed previ-
ously, but in the limit of large wallet dimension
dW , we can show that
Cost (V )C ≈ log dS − sup
ρS∈VS
logHmin(ρS),
to an arbitrarily good approximation (Theo-
rem 5).11
3. Alternative currency
As we saw, there can be many options for a cur-
rency within a resource theory, and the ultimate
11 This issue has also been discussed in [40], where it was
noted that access to large ancilla systems can help ap-
proximate the step functions arbitrarily well.
choice is up to the user (for example, whether they
will be treating small or large systems, or whether
they can easily distinguish states that are close).
We would like to finalize this example with a cur-
rency that makes more explicit use of specifica-
tions to formalize lack of knowledge. The idea is
to model an agent who knows only that the system
could be in any mixture of k pure states — weaker
than knowing that the system is in a uniform mix-
ture of those k states. Consider C2 = {Ck2 }k∪{Ω},
with
Ck2 =
 ⋃
1≤i≤k
{|i〉〈i|}
P ,
where instead of taking maximally mixed states
of different ranks like C before, we take the con-
vex hull of differently sized sets of orthogonal pure
states on the currency system.
In comparison to our original currency C, note
that for each k, Ck ⊆ Ck2 . The set C2 forms again
a currency for the target SΩ, and is in fact equiv-
alent to the currency C before since, under unital
operations, Ck → Ck2 and Ck2 → Ck for all k . In
particular, we can take the usual value function
Val(Ck2 ) = log d − log k and obtain the same ex-
pressions for cost and yield. The convex hull in the
expression for Ck2 is crucial — without it, we would
still get a currency but with different results for the
cost and yield of resources (Proposition B.7).
4. Smooth transformations
As a special case of our framework, we can
model scenarios where we allow for some error
probability in the output of a transformation,
or where we need to make sure that our pro-
tocol is robust against errors in the initial re-
sources. To illustrate this, we can look at re-
sources that correspond to approximate quantum
states, Bε(ρ), according to some metric like the
trace distance or the purified distance based on
the fidelity (more general approximations are dis-
cussed in Ref. [1]). In this case, we recover the
smooth-min entropy [60, 62, 69] as a monotone, as
Cost (Bε(ρ))C = log d− log⌊2H
ε
min(ρ)⌋.
On the other hand, smoothing the input does
not always give us very meaningful results
for this choice of currency, as for example
Yield (Bε(ρ))C = 0 for all ε > 0. The usual
bound for the balance of resource transformations
in terms of cost and yield (which works by sell-
ing the initial resource and buying the final one)
is not helpful when the yield is zero: for example,
the most efficient way to go from Bε(ρ) to Bε
′
(ρ)
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will never go through this currency. This effect
happens partly because the currency is relatively
course-grained (it contains only flat states), and
also because it consists of exact states rather than
smooth specifications (unlike the previously dis-
cussed Creal). By smoothing the currency or adopt-
ing a version of yield that smooths over the output,
we could arrive at more useful statements, involv-
ing for example the smooth max-entropy. First
steps on smooth transformations can be found in
Appendix B.
CONCLUSIONS
While each resource theory has its own under-
standing of how to identify precious resources,
there are common tools to address this question.
In this work, we abstract from particular exam-
ples and identify the general concept of curren-
cies that can be used to quantify the cost of re-
source transformations as well as the value of par-
ticular resources. Our approach allows us to go
beyond commonly employed assumptions of per-
fect independence between the currency and the
system of interest, exactly known quantum states,
perfect and uncorrelated copies of states on indi-
vidual subsystems, or any special form or prop-
erties of the currency states such as the scalabil-
ity of equilibrium systems employed in Refs. [2–5].
As such, our results seem particularly relevant for
thermodynamics of macroscopic systems or sys-
tems of limited control, where slight correlations
cannot be ruled out or only a few properties of
the systems of interest are known. Furthermore,
our approach could prove powerful in the context
of adversarial settings in cryptography, in which
worst-case scenarios need to be assumed [70, 71].
Using the formalism of specifications devel-
oped in [1], we can quantify the value of arbi-
trary descriptions of resources, paving the way to
finding entropic quantities that characterize non-
probabilistic states of knowledge.
As we saw in the example of the resource theory
of unital maps, there are many possible choices
of currency within a theory. Traditional choices
such as copies of pure states or Bell pairs are use-
ful to find monotones from asymptotic conversion
rates [8, 13]. On the other hand, in realistic set-
tings with limited resources, these strict currencies
may result in a big divergence between cost and
yield of target resources, as happened for resources
that were ε-neighbourhoods of states. As a con-
sequence of this gap, the resulting bounds on the
balance of resource conversions become very loose,
and do not give a very useful characterization of
the pre-order of the resource statement. A com-
monly used way out is to always work in the regime
of large systems, where these problems become less
significant; however, we believe it is more natural
to stay in the experimentally realistic setting and
adapt our theoretical tools to meet the constraints
in the lab. In order to find tighter and meaningful
bounds, we might for example use finer currencies,
or smooth currencies made of specifications (e.g.
currencies that are themselves ε-neighbourhoods
of states). Alternatively we might keep the cur-
rency but relax our definitions of cost, yield and
balance to allow for smoothing on the input and
output, corresponding to a small error probability.
Related work
In abstracting from particular resource theo-
ries and identifying common tools to quantify-
ing resources, our work is similar in spirit to
Refs. [7, 8, 38]. However, while these works also ex-
plore the mathematical structure of resource the-
ories, they study the case where resources have
a clear local structure, equipped with a composi-
tion operation that ensures independence between
currency and target (this is the case for symmet-
ric monoidal categories [7, 8] and in particular the
tensor product of quantum states [38]). In other
words, those works study Stage II currencies, with
one direction of fairness (having less does not help)
guaranteed. We see our approach as complemen-
tary to Fritz’s [8], in the sense that he explores
in depth how much we can do once we have a
definite notion of composition, while we ask the
broader question of what independence and com-
position mean, and what we can still do when we
cannot guarantee that local structure in the space
of resources. Another difference is our interest in
single-shot settings, compared to a stronger focus
on conversion rates and asymptotic scenarios in
Refs. [7, 8, 38].
We drew inspiration from many particular ex-
amples of resource theories, and especially from
the abstract approach to thermodynamics in Lieb
and Ynganvon’s work [2–5]. We generalize their
ideas to arbitrary resource theories beyond ther-
modynamics. In addition, we weaken and clarify
the assumptions needed to recover the monotones;
in particular, we can avoid assuming any addi-
tional structure on the currency resources, such as
the scalability requirement present in those works.
Not surprisingly, our results resemble the quanti-
ties and considerations of Refs. [2–5, 40], as well
as those of approaches to quantum thermodynam-
ics [41, 45, 58]. Our results, however, have a wider
range of application.
Our work also bears resemblance to the article
by Gallego et al. on defining work in quantum ther-
modynamics from operational principles [6]. Their
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paper studies how a set of axioms motivated by the
second law of thermodynamics influences possible
definitions of cost or balance of resource trans-
formations. The setting of two players Arthur
and Merlin in that paper relate very closely to
our splitting of resources into currency and tar-
get. Furthermore, the definitions and properties
of the resulting work function are similar to our
statements about balance. For example, the total
order on the currency resources that we demand
seems to follow from the axioms in Ref. [6] — their
approach can hence be seen as an interesting com-
plement to ours. However, we go beyond the scope
of their results not only since we consider general
resource theories beyond quantum thermodynam-
ics, but also because we do not limit ourselves to
exact quantum states and tensor product compo-
sition. Furthermore, we discuss a range of prop-
erties of currencies and their implications, beyond
seeking a unique notion of balance.
Directions
It would be interesting to analyse more thor-
oughly the problem of general resource conversion
in terms of monotones or specific transformation
criteria. In particular, it would be key to gener-
alize familiar monotones such as the relative en-
tropy to the fixed point or free resources of the
resource theory [38] to the case of specifications.
Similarly, one could try to generalize known re-
sults from state to state transformations for par-
ticular resource theories, such as the conditions of
majorization or thermo-majorization in noisy and
thermal operations.
Another direction of further research would be
to look more closely at resource theories in which
we can only find currencies for a limited target.
A good example of this is the resource theory of
thermal operations [13, 15], in which work can
be considered a currency only for states that are
block-diagonal in the energy eigenbasis. Since the
theory is time-translation symmetric, we cannot
introduce coherence from purely incoherent re-
sources [26, 28, 29]. This problem could perhaps
be solved by introducing two or more different cur-
rencies that function together and may or not be
traded against each other (similar to recent ideas
on non-commuting conserved charges in thermo-
dynamics [72–74]) — for example, by introducing
both a work and a coherence storage system. It
would be interesting to extend our results to such
cases and formulate the features of such a theory
in our general language. Finally, it would be inter-
esting to characterize the conditions under which
currencies become fair, like the regime of large sys-
tems, and the connection to conversion rates.
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Appendix A: Formalizing currencies
Here we define currencies in general resource theories using the formalism of [1] for simplicity and
generality, and prove the general results about currencies laid out in the main text. These notions could
also be written in a more traditional language of resource theories, as in Section I.
1. Stage I: currencies as a universal ‘standard’
Given a global state space Ω, following [1] and Section IIA, resources are specifications, that is sets
V ⊆ Ω. We call the set of all non-empty subsets of Ω the specification space SΩ. A currency is then
a subset C ⊆ SΩ of such resources that is ordered (up to equivalences) and universal for a target set
S ⊆ SΩ of resources, as explained in Section I. For simplicity, we furthermore demand that the trivial
(free) resource Ω is both in the currency and the target, Ω ∈ C and Ω ∈ S.
13
Definition A.1 (Currency). Let (SΩ, T ) be a resource theory. A subset of specifications C ⊆ SΩ forms
a currency for a subset S ⊆ SΩ, called the target, if it satisfies both
1. Order. C is ordered (up to equivalences), that is for all C,C′ ∈ C, either C → C′ or C′ → C, and
Ω ∈ C.
2. Universality. for all target specifications V ∈ S, there exists an element of the currency C ∈ C
such that C → V , and a currency element C′ ∈ C such that V → C′, and Ω ∈ S.
Since the set of currency resources is ordered, we can define the value of the currency via a function
to the set of positive real numbers.12
Definition A.2 (Value of currency). We define the value of the currency via a monotonic function
Val : C → R+, that is,
Val(C′) ≥ Val(C) ⇐⇒ C′ → C
for any C,C′ ∈ C. As convention, we define the following threshold values:
1. a minimum value cmin which we set to zero, Val(Ω) := cmin = 0,
2. a saturating value relative to a target S,
csat = sup
V ∈S
Cost (V )C ,
3. the supremum value of a currency (which may be larger than csat, and in particular may be infinite),
csup = sup
C
Val(C)
Naturally, it follows that Val(C′) ≥ Val(C) implies that C′ is at least as powerful as C, in the following
sense.
Proposition A.3 (Value is operational). For any C,C′ ∈ C such that Val(C) ≥ Val(C′) and any A ∈ S,
it holds that
C′ → A =⇒ C → A
A→ C =⇒ A→ C′.
Proof. This result follows straightforwardly from Val(C) ≥ Val(C′), which implies that C → C′, together
with the transitivity of →, since we can concatenate individual processes to get
C → C′, C′ → A =⇒ C → C′ → A
A→ C,C → C′ =⇒ A→ C → C′.
We can now define the cost and yield of resources as follows.
Definition A.4 (Cost and yield of resources). Let (SΩ, T ) be a resource theory with the currency C for
the target S. The cost and yield of a target resource V ∈ S in terms of the currency C are defined as
Cost (V )C := infC∈C
(ValC : C → V ),
Yield (V )C := sup
C∈C
(ValC : V → C).
12 Provided the order on C fits into this set.
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The following theorem shows why currencies are so useful in resource theories. Namely, they allow us
to derive necessary and sufficient conditions for resource conversion. With this theorem, we also recover
the results of [3, 5] more generally for all resource theories equipped with a currency.
Theorem 1 (Conditions for resource conversion in terms of a currency). Let (SΩ, T ) be a resource
theory with a currency C for a target S. Let V,W ∈ S. Then
1. if Yield (V )C > Cost (W )C then V →W , and
2. Cost and Yield are monotones, that is, if V →W , then
Cost (V )C ≥ Cost (W )C
Yield (V )C ≥ Yield (W )C .
Proof. For the first statement, note that Yield (V )C > Cost (W )C implies that there are some Cy , Cc ∈ C
with
Yield (V )C ≥ Val(Cy) > Val(Cc) ≥ Cost (V )C
such that V → Cy and Cc → V (they are achievable selling and buying currency values). Then we can
compose the processes
V → Cy → Cc →W.
To show monotonicity of cost and yield, note that we can again employ transitivity to get that, for any
C,C′ ∈ C, if V →W then
C → V =⇒ C →W and
W → C′ =⇒ V → C′,
and so the statement follows directly from the definitions of Cost and Yield as
Cost (V )C := infC∈C
(ValC : C → V ),
Yield (V )C := sup
C∈C
(ValC : V → C).
in Definition A.4.
We can then also show the following.
Proposition A.5 (Cost is bigger than yield). Let (SΩ, T ) be a resource theory with a currency C for a
target S. Then, for any resource V ∈ S,
Cost (V )C ≥ Yield (V )C .
Proof. Suppose that Yield (V )C > Cost (V )C . Then we can find currency resources Cy, Cc ∈ C with
Yield (V )C ≥ Val(Cy) > Val(Cc) ≥ Cost (V )C
such that V → Cy and Cc → V. But then we can compose the processes to get Cc → V → Cy and so due
to monotonicity of value we would need Val(Cc) ≥ Val(Cy), contradicting our initial assumption that
Yield (V )C > Cost (V )C .
We now give a formal definition of tightness and show that when considering resources for which
the currency is tight, Theorem 1 becomes much stronger: the monotonicity of cost and yield become
necessary and sufficient conditions for resource transformations.
Definition A.6 (Tightness). A currency C with target S is called tight for a resource V ∈ S if
Cost (V )C = Yield (V )C . We then denote the set of resources for which the currency is tight by S= ⊆ S.
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Theorem 2 (Tightness yields necessary and sufficient condition). For two resources V,W ∈ S= for which
a currency C is tight,
V →W ⇐⇒ Cost (V )C ≥ Cost (W )C .
The pre-order on the set S= then becomes a full order (up to equivalences), that is,
∀V,W ∈ S=, either V →W or W → V.
Proof. This statement follows directly from Cost (V )C = Yield (V )C and Cost (W )C = Yield (W )C to-
gether with the proof of Theorem 1, where we can see that in the case when the cost and yield are
achievable, Yield (V )C ≥ Cost (W )C suffices as a sufficient condition for V →W .
The full order (up to equivalences) on S= then follows directly from the full order on R+ to which the
cost maps.
2. Stage II: independent currency
In Stage II, we now look at currencies that satisfy also the independence property, namely that the
currency resources are compatible with any state on the target, and that the currency can be transformed
individually without disturbing the target.
Definition A.7 (Currency independent of target). Let (SΩ, T ) be a resource theory equipped with a
currency C ⊂ SΩ for a target S. Then the currency C is called independent of the target if
1. all specifications C ∈ C are compatible with all specifications V ∈ S, i.e. C ∩ V 6= ∅, and
2. if we can transform C → C′, then we can do it without disturbing the target, that is,
C → C′ =⇒ C ∩ V → C′ ∩ V
for all V ∈ S.
The following proposition shows how a currency resource with higher value can implement all the
resource transformations that a lower currency value can achieve. It extends Proposition A.3 and implies
its result by setting V,C′′ = Ω or W,C′′ = Ω respectively.
Proposition A.8 (Value is operational (independent currencies)). Let (SΩ, T ) be a resource theory with
a currency C independent of target S. Then, for C,C′, C′′ ∈ C and V,W ∈ S, if Val(C′) ≥ Val(C), then
V ∩C →W ∩ C′′ =⇒ V ∩ C′ →W ∩ C′′
V ∩ C′′ →W ∩ C′ =⇒ V ∩ C′′ →W ∩ C.
Proof. To show this statement, we employ transitivity together with independence. Independence means
that Val(C′) ≥ Val(C) =⇒ V ∩ C′ → V ∩C for all V ∈ S, and so we find that
V ∩C →W ∩ C′′ =⇒ V ∩ C′ → V ∩ C →W ∩C′′,
V ∩ C′′ →W ∩ C′ =⇒ V ∩ C′′ →W ∩ C′ →W ∩ C,
which guarantees the result due to transitivity.
We now define the balance of resource transformations conditioned on the available currency C in the
wallet as follows. Naturally, this is only defined when the transformation is actually possible with C.
Definition A.9 (Balance). Let (SΩ, T ) be a resource theory with the currency C for a target S that
satisfies the independence condition (Definition A.7). Then we define the balance of transforming a
resource V into another resource W on the target when having access to the currency resource C ∈ C as
Balance(V →W |C)C := sup
C′∈C
{Val(C′)−Val(C) : V ∩ C →W ∩C′}.
As we have discussed in Section I, the balance will in general depend on the available currency C in
the wallet. If the currency is fair, there will not be such a dependence (see Proposition A.13).
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3. Stage III: fair currency
Definition A.10 (Fair currency). A currency C with target S and value function Val : C → R+ is called
fair if for any C1, C2 ∈ C with ∆ := Val(C2)−Val(C1) and V,W ∈ S such that
V ∩C1 →W ∩C2,
the following holds:
1. for any C′1 ∈ C with −∆ ≤ Val(C′1) < csup −∆, there exists a C′2 ∈ C such that
V ∩ C′1 →W ∩ C′2
and Val(C′2)−Val(C′1) = ∆.
2. for any C′2 ∈ C with ∆ ≤ Val(C′2), there exists a C′1 ∈ C such that
V ∩ C′1 →W ∩ C′2
and Val(C′2)−Val(C′1) = ∆.
We say that a currency is good for the rich (having less does not help) if the above two conditions hold
for Val(C′1) ≥ Val(C1) and Val(C′2) ≥ Val(C2) respectively.
Similarly, we call a currency good for the poor (having more does not help) if they hold for Val(C′1) ≤
Val(C1) and Val(C
′
2) ≤ Val(C2).
As explained in Section I, fairness guarantees that, within suitable bounds, whether or not a trans-
formation can be facilitated with currency in the wallet only depends on the difference in value between
initial and final currency resource, but not on the absolute values of currency in the wallet.
Looking at the boundaries from fairness more precisely, we see that the left-hand ones, −∆ ≤ Val(C′1)
and ∆ ≤ Val(C′2), simply makes sure that the value of C′1 is not too low for the balance to be defined.
The right-hand conditions concern large currency values and transformations that allow us to extract
extra currency. For example, if we start from a currency of high value Val(C′1) ≥ csup −∆, the balance
of the transformation must be less than ∆, because we cannot exceed the boundary csup by definition.
a. Having less does not help
We will now discuss the implications of a currency that is good for the rich. For such a currency,
having less does not help — there are no discounts for the poor.
Proposition A.11 (Balance non-decreasing with available currency). Let C be a currency that is good
for the rich. Then, for C′1 within the bounds specified by fairness in Definition A.10,
Val(C1) ≤ Val(C′1) =⇒ Balance(V →W |C1)C ≤ Balance(V →W |C′1)C .
Proof. If the currency is good for the rich, then if Val(C1) ≤ Val(C′1), anything that can be implemented
with C1 can also be implemented with C
′
1 while inducing the same difference in value on the currency
(within the bounds specified by Definition A.10). But then from the expression for the balance in
Definition A.9,
Balance(V →W |C1)C := sup
C2∈C
{ValC2 −ValC1 : V ∩C1 →W ∩ C2},
it follows that
Balance(V →W |C1)C ≤ Balance(V →W |C′1)C .
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b. Having more does not help
Here, we discuss the implications of a currency that is good for the poor. In such a theory, having
more does not help — there are no discounts for the rich.
Proposition A.12 (Balance non-increasing with available currency). Let C be a currency that is good
for the poor. Then for C′1 within the bounds specified by fairness in Definition A.10,
Val(C1) ≥ Val(C′1) =⇒ Balance(V →W |C1)C ≤ Balance(V →W |C′1)C .
Proof. If the currency is good for the poor, then if Val(C1) ≥ Val(C′1), anything that can be done with
C1 can also be implemented with C
′
1 (within the bounds specified by Definition A.10). But then from
the expression for the balance in Definition A.9 it follows that
Val(C1) ≥ Val(C′1) =⇒ Balance(V →W |C1)C ≤ Balance(V →W |C′1)C .
c. Both directions
As explained in Section I, fairness guarantees that, within suitable bounds, whether or not a transfor-
mation can be facilitated with currency only depends on the difference in value between initial and final
currency resource in the wallet, but not on their absolute values. This of course implies that also the
balance of a resource transformation only depends on this difference and not on the available currency
C in the wallet, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition A.13 (Fairness: balance is independent of available currency). Let (SΩ, T ) be a resource
theory equipped with a fair currency C for a target S. Then, for any two resources V,W ∈ S and all
C,C′ ∈ C within suitable bounds (as specified by fairness),
Balance(V →W |C)C = Balance(V →W |C′)C ,
and we can define
Balance(V →W )C := sup
C∈C
Balance(V →W |C)C
as the unique balance of the transformation from V to W in terms of the currency (up to boundary
effects).
Proof. It follows directly from Propositions A.11 and A.12 that for any two resources V,W ∈ S and all
C,C′ ∈ C, within suitable bounds (as specified by fairness)
Balance(V →W |C)C = Balance(V →W |C′)C .
Then, since the balance of transforming V intoW always exists for some initial C (at worst, it corresponds
to the cost of W ), the quantity
Balance(V →W )C := sup
C∈C
Balance(V →W |C)C
is always well-defined.
As discussed in Section I, the cost and the yield of resources are then related to the balance. Firstly,
we can express the cost and yield of resources in terms of the balance as follows.
Theorem 3 (Cost and yield in terms of balance, for fair currencies). Let (SΩ, T ) be a resource theory
equipped with a fair currency C for a target S. Then, for any resource V ∈ S,
Cost (V )C = −Balance(Ω→ V )C ,
Yield (V )C = Balance(V → Ω)C .
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Proof. To show the first statement, note that Ω ∈ C and so for any C ∈ C and V ∈ S,
Cost (V )C := infC∈C
(Val(C) : C → V )
[fairness] = inf
C,C′∈C
(Val(C)−Val(C′) : C → V ∩ C′)
= −Balance(Ω→ V )C .
For the second statement, note that Ω is the least valuable currency resource, and Yield (V )C ≥ 0. This
means that boundary conditions are not relevant and so fairness guarantees that
Yield (V )C = Balance(V → Ω|Ω)C = Balance(V → Ω)C .
Secondly, we can also relate the balance for an arbitrary resource transformation to the yield and cost
of the initial and final resource respectively.
Theorem 4 (Balance bounds in terms of cost and yield, for fair currencies). Let there be a resource
theory with a fair currency C for a target S. Then for any V,W ∈ S,
Balance(V →W )C ≥ Yield (V )C − Cost (W )C − ε˜
for arbitrarily small or zero ε˜ ≥ 0 (depending on whether or not the cost and yield are achievable).
If the currency is tight for resources V,W , furthermore
Balance(V →W )C = Yield (V )C − Cost (W )C = Cost (V )C − Cost (W )C .
Proof. This proof is split as follows:
1. General fair currency
(a) Case Cost (W )C < Yield (V )C
(b) Case Cost (W )C ≥ Yield (V )C
2. Tight currency
(a) Case Balance(V →W )C > 0
(b) Case Balance(V →W )C ≤ 0
Before we begin, note that since the cost is defined as Cost (W )C = infC∈C{Val(C) : C → W}, there
will be a currency element C ∈ C such that Val(C) = Cost (W )C + ε for an arbitrarily small ε ≥ 0 and
C →W (because the cost may not be attainable). The same reasoning holds for the yield and balance.
For fair currencies, these quantities are all attainable and as such ε = 0.
1. General fair currency.
(a) Case Cost (W )C < Yield (V )C
In this case, there exist elements Cy, Cc ∈ C such that V → Cy → Cc →W and
Yield (V )C ≥ Val(Cy) > Val(Cc) ≥ Cost (W )C ,
with Val(Cy) = Yield (V )C − ε and Val(Cc) = Cost (W )C + ε′ for some arbitrarily small or
zero ε, ε′ ≥ 0 (depending on whether or not Yield (V )C and Cost (W )C are achievable).
Then, by fairness, there exists another currency resource Cα such that V → Cy → W ∩ Cα
and
0 < Val(Cα) = Val(Cy)−Val(Cc)
= Yield (V )C − ε− (Cost (W )C + ε′).
We obtain for the balance
Balance(V →W )C = sup
C,C′′
{Val(C)−Val(C′′) : C′′ ∩ V → C ∩W}
≥ Val(Cα) = Yield (V )C − Cost (W )C − (ε+ ε′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ε˜
.
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(b) Case Cost (W )C ≥ Yield (V )C
Let Cc ∈ C be an achievable cost value of W with Cc → W and Val(Cc) = Cost (W )C + ε for
arbitrarily small or zero ε ≥ 0. Then, due to fairness,
Yield (V )C = Balance(V → Ω)C
= sup
C′′
{Val(Cc)−Val(C′′) : C′′ ∩ V → Cc ∩ Ω}
= Val(Cc)−Val(C′) + ε′
for some C′ ∈ C such that C′ ∩ V → Cc and for an arbitrarily small or zero ε′. But then we
can implement V ∩ C′ → Cc →W , and so
Balance(V →W )C ≥ −Val(C′) = Yield (V )C − Cost (W )C − ε− ε′
for arbitrarily small or zero ε, ε′ ≥ 0 (depending on whether or not Yield (V )C and Cost (W )C
are achievable).
2. Currency is tight for V and W .
Note that in this case, the yield and cost are attainable.
(a) Case Balance(V →W )C > 0
In this case
Balance(V →W )C = sup
C1,C2∈C
(ValC1 −ValC2 : V ∩ C2 →W ∩C1)
[fairness, Balance(V →W )C > 0] = sup
C1∈C
(ValC1 : V →W ∩ C1)
[Cost (W )C = Yield (W )C ] = sup
C∈C
(ValC − Cost (W )C : V → C)
= Yield (V )C − Cost (W )C ,
where in the third line we used that for a fair currency that is tight for W , W ∩C1 ⇋ C when
ValC = ValC1 +Cost (W )C .
(b) Case Balance(V →W )C ≤ 0
In this case,
Balance(V →W )C = sup
C1,C2∈C
(ValC2 −ValC1 : V ∩ C1 →W ∩C2)
[fairness, Balance(V →W )C ≤ 0] = sup
C1∈C
(−ValC1 : V ∩C1 →W )
[Cost (V )C = Yield (V )C ] = sup
C∈C
(−ValC +Yield (V )C : C →W )
= Yield (V )C − Cost (W )C ,
where in the third line we used that V ∩ C1 ⇋ C with ValC = ValC1 +Yield (V )C .
Appendix B: Examples
In this appendix we apply our notions of currencies to three resource theories: LOCC, thermal oper-
ations and unital maps.
1. Bell pairs in LOCC
Here show that the familiar example of Bell pairs in LOCC satisfies Definitions A.1 and A.7 and can
be understood as a Stage II currency.
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Proposition B.1 (Bell pairs are a Stage II currency). Consider the resource theory of two-party LOCC
over the partition A′ ⊗ (⊗Ni Ai)‖B′ ⊗ (⊗Ni Bi), in a global Hilbert space
Hglobal =
(
N⊗
i
(Ai ⊗Bi)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
wallet
⊗A′ ⊗ B˜′︸ ︷︷ ︸
target
,
where each Ai and Bi is a qubit, and A
′, B′ are composed of N qubits each.
Take the currency C composed of specifications of a certain number n of copies of Bell pairs in the wallet,
C = {Ψn}Nn=1 ∪ {Ψ0 = Ω}, with Ψn = {σglobal : σA1B1...AnBn = |ψ〉〈ψ|⊗n}, and |ψ〉 = (|00〉+ |11〉)/
√
2.
Take the target S to be any set of specifications that are local in A′ ⊗B′, for example S = {ρ̂A′B′}ρ,
with
ρ̂A′B′ = {σglobal : σA′B′ = ρA′B′}.
Then C forms a currency for target S according to Definition A.1 and satisfies the independence
condition A.7.
Proof. For C to satisfy Definition A.1, we need to check the following things:
1. Order: ∀Ψn,Ψm ∈ C, either Ψn → Ψm or Ψm → Ψn.
This is true since for n ≥ m, Ψn ⊆ Ψm, and so trivially by mere forgetting of information on some
of the qubits
n ≥ m =⇒ Ψn → Ψm.
Physically, any allowed transformation on the wallet can only degrade the currency resource and
result in a loss of available maximally entangled qubits.
2. Universality: for all target specifications V ∈ S, there is a Ψn ∈ C such that Ψn → V , and there is
a Ψm ∈ C such that V → Ψm.
Due to teleportation, any bipartite state ρA′B′ on a certain number of qubits can be generated
from a corresponding amount of maximally entangled qubits under LOCC [64]. Going to a more
general specification containing at least one local state is just a matter of forgetting. Hence, one
can achieve any transformation
Ψn → V
for some n ≤ N . Also, trivially V → Ω and Ω ∈ C.
To see that C also satisfies the independence condition in Definition A.7, note that because the wallet
and the target A′B′ are different subsystems, any state in the wallet is compatible with any state in the
target (at the very least, we can combine any two local states with the tensor product). Furthermore,
indeed Ψn → Ψm implies we can do so without disturbing the target: this is true since obviously
merely forgetting information about some of the qubits in the wallet does not affect the state on the
systems A′B′. More generally, any transformation in the wallet (such as one that replaces the maximally
entangled state on some of the qubits by the state |00〉) on the two parties leaves the state on A′B′
invariant.
Finally, we can assign the value function Val(Ψn) = n since n ≥ m is a necessary and sufficient
condition for the transformation Ψn → Ψm. Note that n = 0 corresponds to the adopted convention of
minimal value for Ω.
2. Work in thermal operations
Here we show that the usual notion of work in thermal operations (for block-diagonal states) is a Stage
II currency. This is an example of a currency that is not made of copies of individual states, that is, a
currency without a subsystem structure inside the wallet.
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Just like in the case of Proposition B.1, this statement constitutes merely an example to show how for
a specific target system we can construct a currency, and so it does not constitute a rigorous analysis
of the most general cases of currencies in this theory. For example, it would be interesting to study a
currency made out of confidence regions around fixed values of energy [75].
Proposition B.2 (Stage II currency in quantum thermodynamics). Consider the resource theory of
thermal operations in a global Hilbert space S⊗W , where each subsystem has dimension d, and identical
individual Hamiltonians Hi =
∑
k k∆ |Ek〉〈Ek|i. Then the currency C = {Ck}k ∪ {Ω}, with
Ck = {σCS : TrS(σCS) = |Ek〉〈Ek|C}
is a Stage II currency for the target made out of local block-diagonal states on S, with the value function
Val(Ck) = Ek, Val(Ω) = 0.
Proof. For block-diagonal states in the energy eigenbasis, whether or not two states can be transformed
into one another in the resource theory of thermal operations can be determined by means of the thermo-
majorization condition, which amounts to comparing the corresponding Lorentz curves of the quantum
states [45, 76]. We may check the following points:
1. Order: ∀C,C′ ∈ C, either C → C′ or C′ → C.
This is true since for Ei ≥ Ej , thermo-majorization guarantees that Ci → Cj . Also, trivially
C → Ω for any C ∈ C.
2. Universality: for all target specifications V,W ∈ S, there is a C ∈ C such that C → V , and a
C′ ∈ C such that V → C′.
It is clear that the pure state on the maximum energy eigenvalue on S thermo-majorizes any other
state on S that is block-diagonal in the energy eigenbasis. Hence, starting from the largest energy
eigenstate on system C we can simply swap systems C and S and then generate the required state on
S, thus achieving any transformation Cmax → V , with Cmax = {σCS : TrS(σCS) = |Emax〉〈Emax|C}
and Emax the maximum energy eigenvalue. Also, trivially V → Ω and Ω ∈ C.
3. Non-disturbance: for C,C′ ∈ C, we have that C → C′ implies we can do so without disturbing the
target.
Transformations on system C do not affect the states in the target system S since local quantum
maps are of the form EC ⊗ 1S .
4. Compatibility: all C ∈ C can be composed with any target resource.
This is true because C and S are different subsystems, and so any state on C is compatible with
any state on S (at the very least, we can combine any two states on C and S with the tensor
product).
3. Resource theory of unital maps
a. Stage I currency
We now give an explicit Stage I currency for the resource theory of unital maps.
Proposition B.3 (Currency for unital maps). The set C = {Ck}k∈{1,...d}∪{Ω} with Ck =
{
Πk
k
}
, where
Πk denotes the projector onto the first k vectors in a given basis, forms a universal currency under unital
maps on a Hilbert space of dimension d.
Proof. Under unital maps, the pre-order on states is given by majorization [40, 43–46]. We need to check
the following things:
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1. Order: the set C of the currency is ordered (up to equivalence) by →.
This holds because the states in C are ordered by the rank (there is a clear order given by ma-
jorization coming from unital maps on C, see e.g. [40]).
2. Universality: for all target specifications V (in this case all specifications on the whole d-dimensional
system), there exists an element of the currency C ∈ C such that C → V and an element of the
currency C′ ∈ C such that V → C′.
To see why the first statement holds, note that in order to prepare V , it is enough to prepare any
one state ρ ∈ V , such as the state with the smallest maximum eigenvalue. As majorization tells us
(see e.g. Ref. [40]), this will always be possible with unital maps from a currency state with small
enough rank (in the worst case, from the pure state).
To show the second statement, note that Ω ∈ C, and we can always achieve V → Ω.
In terms of this currency, we can now determine the cost of a specification as follows.
Proposition B.4 (Cost for unital maps). The cost of a specification V under unital maps in terms of
the currency C as above is given by
Cost (V )C = infρ∈V
logm(ρ),
where
m(ρ) =
d
⌊λ−1max(ρ)⌋
=
d
⌊2Hmin(ρ)⌋
with λmax(ρ) the largest eigenvalue of ρ and ⌊·⌋ denoting the nearest integer (from below) to the enclosed
expression.
Proof. This proof consists of two parts: first, we reduce the problem of finding the cost of a specification
V to an optimization over simple state transformations. Then we apply known results on majorization
and follow the results in Ref. [40] to solve it.
Since unital maps take quantum states to quantum states,{
Πk
k
}
→ V
is true if and only if there is a state ρ ∈ V such that
{
Πk
k
}
→ {ρ}. Then we can employ the majorization
condition, which states that under unital maps
ρ→ σ ⇐⇒ ∀j ≤ d,
j∑
i=1
λiρ ≥
j∑
i=1
λiσ,
where λiρ denotes the i-th eigenvalue of ρ (where we number the eigenvalues in decreasing order). Since
the currency state Π
k
k is uniform, we can implement
Πk
k
→ ρ
with unital maps if and only if
1
k
≥ λmax(ρ).
Hence we find that indeed
Cost (V )C = infρ∈V,k≤d
(
log d− log k :
{
Πk
k
}
→ {ρ}
)
= inf
ρ∈V,k≤d
(
log d− log k : 1
k
≥ λmax(ρ)
)
= inf
ρ∈V
(
log d− log⌊λ−1max(ρ)⌋
)
.
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Similarly, we find the following result for the yield of a specification.
Proposition B.5 (Yield for unital maps). The yield of a specification V under unital maps in terms of
the currency C as above satisfies
Yield (V )C = log d− max
ρ∈V P
H0(ρ),
where V P denotes the convex hull of V [1], and H0(ρ) = log rank(ρ).
Proof. First we show that maxρ∈V P H0(ρ) = log deff, where deff ≤ d is the smallest number such that
there exists a basis {|i〉}di=1 such that Tr(ρΠdeff) = 1 for all ρ ∈ V , with
Πdeff =
deff∑
i=1
|i〉〈i|.
In other words, deff is defined such that each element ρ ∈ V can be expressed in the basis {|i〉}di=1 as
ρ =

ρeff 0 · · · 0
0 0
...
. . .
0 0

,
where ρeff acts on a Hilbert space of dimension deff. In particular, this means that we can express all
elements of V in the deff−dimensional basis {|i〉}deffi=1. This implies that V itself lives in a vector space Γ
of dimension d2eff − 1, because it is composed of density matrices that can be expressed using only deff
basis elements.
Now we can look at the cone of positive semi-definite matrices on Hilbert spaces of dimension deff
(of which normalized density matrices form an affine slice). The extremal faces of this cone are formed
by low-rank matrices, and the interior of the cone is made of all full-rank matrices, [77, Chapter II,
Proposition 12.3]. The density matrices in the set V cannot all lie on the same face of the cone, as this
would contradict the definition of deff (because then we would be able to project all points of V onto the
same lower-dimensional space). This implies that if we take the convex hull of V , some points will lie in
the interior of the cone and therefore have full rank, which implies
∃ ρ ∈ V P : H0(ρ) = log deff.
This is also the maximal entropy for deff−dimensional density matrices, and so we have shown that
maxρ∈V P H0(ρ) = log deff.
To show that Yield (V )C ≥ log d− log deff, we apply the unital map
E(ρ) = Tr(ρΠ
deff)
deff
Πdeff + (1d −Πdeff) ρ (1d −Πdeff)
to each element ρ ∈ V . Because of the way we defined Πdeff , we obtain
E(V ) = Π
deff
deff
∈ Cdeff ,
which is a currency element, and therefore
Yield (V )C ≥ Val(Cdeff) = log d− log deff.
To show that Yield (V )C ≤ log d − log deff, suppose that there exists a number k < deff such that
V → Ck. That is, there is some unital map E ′ that maps every element in V to the state Πk/k. In
24
particular, E ′ maps all elements of V to the same face of the cone. But then, by linearity E ′ also maps
convex combinations of states in V , which as we showed before lie in the interior of the cone (unless V was
already on a face, which would contradict the definition of deff), to Π
k/k. This is however not possible,
because the rank of a state cannot decrease under unital maps (due to the majorization condition), and
states in the interior have full rank deff while rank(Π
k/k) = k < deff by assumption. Hence we have
reached a contradiction.
b. Stage II currency
Assuming a bipartite system W ⊗ S, we can construct a Stage II currency for resources on system S
which consists of local resources on W .
Proposition B.6 (Stage II currency for unital maps). Consider the resource theory of unital maps in a
global Hilbert space W ⊗S, with dW := dimW ≥ dimS =: dS . The set C = {Ck}k∈{1,...dW } ∪{Ω}, with
Ck =
{
σWS : TrS(σWS) =
ΠkW
k
}
,
where ΠkW denotes the projector onto k states in a given basis on system W , forms a currency for the
target defined through
V ∈ S ⇐⇒ V = {σWS : TrW (σWS) ∈ VS}
for some set VS of reduced density matrices on system S. This currency furthermore satisfies independence
according to Definition A.7.
Proof. We need to check the following things:
1. Order: the set C of the currency is ordered (up to equivalence) by →.
For the specification Ck, it holds that
Ck ⇌ {ρ˜SW } =
{
ΠkW
k
⊗ 1S
dS
}
since ρ˜SW ∈ Ck and we can always use unital operations to replace the state on S by the fully
mixed state. But then, the majorization condition for unital maps on system W tells us that
k′ ≥ k ⇐⇒ Π
k
W
k
⊗ 1S
dS
→ Π
k′
W
k′
⊗ 1S
dS
.
Since these states are interchangeable with the respective currencies, we have that Ck → Ck′ if
and only if k′ ≥ k. Finally, Ck → Ω for any k, and also Ω→ CdW , since we can always replace the
state in W by a fully mixed state by means of a unital operation.
Hence the currency resources are ordered (up to the equivalence of CdW to Ω).
2. Universality: for all target specifications V ∈ S, there exists an element of the currency C ∈ C such
that C → V , and an element C′ ∈ C such that V → C′.
To see why the former holds, note that given dW = dim(W ) ≥ dim(S) = dS , we can always start
from the currency resource C1 = {σSW : TrS(σSW ) = |1〉〈1|W } and apply the unitary
USW =
dS∑
i6=j;i,j=1
|ij〉〈ji|SW +
dW∑
i=dS+1
|ii〉〈ii|SW ,
where the second sum vanishes if dS = dW . This unitary essentially achieves a swap of the state
on system S with part of W of the same size. In particular, the reduced state on S is now |1〉〈1|S ,
and so one can reach the specification
Y = {σSW : TrW (σSW ) = |1〉〈1|}.
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We now use the idea from the proof of order, namely that Y is interconvertible with the following
state,
Y ⇌ {τSW } =
{
|1〉〈1|S ⊗ 1W
dW
}
.
Then we can prepare any state in VS in system S from the pure state in S by means of a unital map
on S (since the pure state majorizes every other state, this is possible), that is, for any ρS ∈ VS ,
{τSW } →
{
ρS ⊗ 1W
dW
}
.
As a result, one can reach a specification
X = {σSW : TrW (σSW ) = ρS}
for any particular ρS ∈ VS . But then clearly C1 → V.
To see why the second statement holds, note that Ω ∈ C and clearly V → Ω for any V ∈ S.
3. Compatibility: all specifications Ck ∈ C (including Ω) can be composed with any specification V
in the target S.
This holds since we can trivially compose any state ρS ∈ VS in S with any state Π
k
W
k in W via the
tensor product. Since both V and Ck contain only local information about the systems S and W
respectively, at the very least
ΠkW
k ⊗ ρS ∈ V ∩ Ck.
4. Non-disturbance: for two currency resources Ck, Cl ∈ C, if we can transform Ck → Cl, then we
can do this without disturbing the target, i.e.
Ck → Cl =⇒ V ∩ Ck → V ∩ Cl.
This holds because a unital map on W used in order to convert between the currency states only
involves system W and leaves the target space unchanged.
We may now compute the cost and yield of specifications.
Theorem 5 (Cost and yield for unital maps with Stage II currency). Let S ⊗W be a bipartite system
with dW ≥ dS . Then, in terms of the currency C of Proposition B.6, the cost and yield of resources
V ∈ S satisfy
inf
ρS∈VS
log dS −Hmin(ρS) ≤ Cost (V )C ≤ infρS∈VS log
(
dS
⌊2Hmin(ρS)⌋
)
and
Yield (V )C = log dS − max
ρS∈V PS
H0(ρS).
Furthermore, in the limit of large currency dimension dW , the cost of a resource V can approximate the
value infρS∈VS log dS −Hmin(ρS) arbitrarily closely. That is, for any ε > 0 and any target dimension dS ,
we can find a currency dimension dW ≥ dS such that
inf
ρS∈VS
log dS −Hmin(ρS) ≥ Cost (V )C ≥ infρS∈VS log dS −Hmin(ρS)− ε.
Proof. We start from the definitions of cost and yield for this currency, which can be expressed as
Cost (V )C = infC∈C
{ValC : C → V } = log dW − sup
1≤k≤dW
{log k : Ck → V }
Yield (V )C = sup
C∈C
{ValC : V → C} = log dW − inf
1≤k≤dW
{log k : V → Ck},
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for integer values of k. We note that our currency elements are inter-convertible with simpler ones,
Ck =
{
σWS : TrS(σWS) =
ΠkW
k
}
⇋
{
ΠkW
k
⊗ 1S
dS
}
=: C˜k,
because under unital maps we are always allowed to replace the state on S by the maximally mixed state
that is uncorrelated with W , and in the other direction C˜k ⊆ Ck. Similarly, V is inter-convertible with
V˜ =
{
ρS ⊗ 1W
dW
: ρS ∈ VS
}
as we can always replace the state in W by the maximally mixed state and in the other direction again
V˜ ⊆ V . The definitions of cost and yield become
Cost (V )C = log dW − sup
k≤dW
{
log k :
{
1S
dS
⊗ Π
k
W
k
}
→
{
ρS ⊗ 1W
dW
: ρS ∈ VS
}}
Yield (V )C = log dW − infk≤dW
{
log k :
{
ρS ⊗ 1W
dW
: ρS ∈ VS
}
→
{
1S
dS
⊗ Π
k
W
k
}}
.
For the cost, we can now argue analogously to Proposition B.4: since unital maps take states to states,
the cost above is equivalent to the expression
Cost (V )C = log dW − sup
k≤dW ,ρS∈VS
{
log k :
{
1S
dS
⊗ Π
k
W
k
}
→
{
ρS ⊗ 1W
dW
}}
).
Majorization gives us a necessary and sufficient condition for this state transformation,
1S
dS
⊗ Π
k
W
k
→ ρS ⊗ 1W
dW
⇐⇒ 1
k dS
≥ λmax(ρS)
dW
and so for the optimal k,
k = sup
ρS∈VS
⌊
dW
dS λmax(ρS)
⌋
≥ dW
dS
sup
ρS∈VS
⌊
λ−1max(ρS)
⌋
.
Hence
Cost (V )C = log dW − log k ≤ log dS − sup
ρS∈VS
log⌊λ−1max(ρ)⌋
= inf
ρS∈VS
log dS − log
⌊
2Hmin(ρS)
⌋
,
while in the other direction
Cost (V )C ≥ log dS + infρS∈VS logλmax(ρ)
= log dS − sup
ρS∈VS
Hmin(ρS).
Finally, we note that in the limit of large dW , the real number dS · λmax(ρS) ≥ 1 can be approximated
arbitrarily closely by a rational dWk for dW , k ∈ N with k ≤ dW . In particular, for any ε > 0, we can
choose dW , k ∈ N such that for the optimal ρS
log dS −Hmin(ρS) ≥ log dW − log k ≥ log dS −Hmin(ρS)− ε.
But this implies that indeed
inf
ρS∈VS
log dS −Hmin(ρS) ≥ Cost (V )C ≥ infρS∈VS log dS −Hmin(ρS)− ε.
For the yield, we can employ the same technique as in Proposition B.5 because the output of the
transformation {
ρS ⊗ 1W
dW
: ρS ∈ VS
}
→
{
1S
dS
⊗ Π
k
W
k
}
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from the expression for the yield above is a uniform state of rank dS · k (we could see it as a currency
state in d = dS · dW ). Hence, with V˜ =
{
ρS ⊗ 1WdW : ρS ∈ VS
}
, we find
Yield (V )C = log dS + log dW − log deff(V˜ ).
Then we note that deff(V˜ ) = dW · deff(VS) and, again from Proposition B.5, log deff(VS) =
maxρS∈VS H0(ρS), and so
Yield (V )C = log dS − maxρS∈VSH0(ρS)
as required.
c. Alternative currencies
We may discuss alternative currencies for the resource theory of unital maps.
Proposition B.7 (Equivalent currency for unital maps). The currency C of uniform states of different
ranks is equivalent to the currency C2 = {Ck2 }k ∪ {Ω} made out of the convex hull of differently sized
sets of orthogonal pure states,
Ck2 = ({|i〉〈i|}1≤i≤k)P ,
in the sense that
∀Ck ∈ C, Ck2 ∈ C2, Ck → Ck2 and Ck2 → Ck.
Proof. For the first statement, we define
Val(C2) := min
k
(
log d− log k : Π
k
k
∈ C2
)
and so it is easy to see that for C ∈ C,
Val(C) = Val(C2) =⇒ C → C2
since C ⊆ C2. The other direction, C2 → C, can be easily established from a unital map that replaces the
currency state by a uniform state of rank of the effective dimension ofC2 as in the proof of Proposition B.5,
yielding precisely C.
Proposition B.8 (Nonequivalent currency). The statement of Proposition B.7 does not hold for a set
C3 = {Ck3 }k ∪ {Ω} made of differently sized sets of orthogonal states without the convex hull,
Ck3 = {|i〉〈i|}1≤i≤k,
since (as a counterexample) {
12
2
}
9 {|1〉〈1|, |2〉〈2|},
i.e. C2 9 C23 . The set C3 does nevertheless form a currency for SΩ.
Proof. To see that it is indeed true that in a qubit S
C2 =
{
12
2
}
9 {|1〉〈1|, |2〉〈2|} = C22 ,
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it is enough to employ Proposition B.4: we see that in terms of the currency C,
Cost ({|1〉〈1|, |2〉〈2|})C
= inf
ρ∈{|1〉〈1|,|2〉〈2|}
[log 2− log⌊2Hmin(ρ)⌋]
= 1 > 0 = Cost
({
12
2
})
C
,
and so since Cost (·)C is a monotone along the pre-order,
{
12
2
}
9 {|1〉〈1|, |2〉〈2|}.
To see that C3 is still a currency, note that it satisfies order and universality for SΩ: universality holds
because under unital maps, C13 = {|1〉〈1|} can be transformed into any state ρ (this follows from simple
majorization), and so for any V ∈ SΩ, C13 → V . In the other direction, V → Ω for any V ∈ SΩ and
Ω ∈ C3.
To see why order holds, note that for k′ ≥ k, simply Ck3 ⊆ Ck
′
3 and so C
k
3 → Ck
′
3 . To see that this only
holds in one direction, that is, that Ck
′
3 9 C
k
3 for k
′ > k, note that if there was a map that takes Ck
′
3
to Ck3 , then it would have to take all states in C
k′
3 into some state in C
k
3 . But such a map would then
also take the uniform state over the first k′ eigenvalues to something that has support only on the first
k eigenvalues, so that
pik
′
:=
{
Πk
′
k′
}
→ {τ}
for some τ such that Tr(Πkτ) = 1. But then H0(τ) ≤ H0(pik′ ), which contradicts the fact that H0 is a
monotone under unital maps (this follows from the majorization condition). Hence
k′ ≥ k ⇐⇒ Ck3 → Ck
′
3 .
d. Approximations and probability of failure
As a special case of our framework, we can model cases where we allow for some error probability in
the output of a transformation, or where we need to make sure that our protocol is robust against errors
in the initial resources. In the first case, the transformation will become cheaper to implement since we
can save some currency by betting on a successful outcome. In the second case, the error makes it harder
to still achieve the final resource, so that the transformation becomes more expensive.
To illustrate how this would work, we can look at the special case of resources that correspond to
approximate quantum states, Bε(ρ), according to some metric like the trace distance or the purified
distance based on the fidelity. More generally, we may look at cases beyond such metrics, namely
arbitrary coarse-grainings of resources represented by so-called approximation structures as introduced
in [1], which again give us a notion of epsilon balls, Bε(·), for parameters 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1.
We can now introduce such smoothing both at the input and the output of transformations, to address
the two types of error probability. For example, we then find the following result for the cost of an
approximate quantum state.
Proposition B.9 (Cost of approximations for unital maps). In terms of the Stage I currency C introduced
before, the specification Bε(ρ) for some 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1 (where the smoothing is taken according to some metric
on state space such as the trace distance or the fidelity) satisfies
Cost (Bε(ρ))C = log d− sup
σ∈Bε(ρ)
log⌊2Hmin(σ)⌋
= log d− log⌊2Hεmin(ρ)⌋
Proof. The proof of this follows directly from the definition of Hεmin as
Hεmin(ρ) = sup
σ∈Bε(ρ)
Hmin(σ),
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since then we immediately get
Cost (Bε(ρ))C = log d− sup
σ∈Bε(ρ)
log⌊2Hmin(σ)⌋
= log d− log⌊2supσ∈Bε(ρ) Hmin(σ)⌋
= log d− log⌊2Hεmin(ρ)⌋.
More generally, the larger the smoothing we introduce, the smaller the cost (Section II),
ε ≥ ε′ =⇒ Cost (Bε(ρ))C ≤ Cost
(
Bε′(ρ)
)
C
.
On the other hand, introducing the smoothing on the input, we can look at the yield of an approximate
quantum state. Let us look at the particular example where we are interested in the yield of Bε(|1〉〈1|)
in a d-dimensional system for 0 < ε < 1. In this case, the resource in principle has full support on the
whole basis, since for example σ = (1 − ε)|1〉〈1| + εd−1
(∑d
i=2 |i〉〈i|
)
∈ Bε(|1〉〈1|) and Yield (σ)C = 0.
But then clearly the only resource (except Ω) in the currency C that can be reached from Bε(|1〉〈1|) is
Cd = {1dd }, and so Yield (Bε(|1〉〈1|))C = 0.
More generally in the resource theory of unital maps, due to the same reasoning, the yield of an
approximate state as specified by an error parameter ε > 0 without further limitations (such as additional
knowledge about the state) or further relaxations (such as allowing to reach an approximate currency
resource) will be zero for this currency C. This is partly because the currency is relatively course-grained
(it contains only flat states), but also because it consists of exact states rather than itself allowing for a
probability of error. By adapting the currency in this way, we could hence arrive at different, perhaps
more useful, statements about the yield of approximate states.
Naturally, we find that more generally for arbitrary approximation structures [1] and currencies with
large enough target to include the approximate states respectively,
ε ≥ ε′ =⇒ Yield (Bε(ρ))C ≤ Yield
(
Bε′(ρ)
)
C
.
More generally, we could look at the balance of going between smooth input and output specifications,
for example
V ε := {σWS : σS ∈ Bε(ρS)},
W ε
′
:= {σWS : σS ∈ Bε
′
(τS)}.
One immediate statement is that for δ ≥ 0,
Balance(V ε →W ε′ |C)C ≥ Balance(V ε+δ →W ε
′ |C)C
Balance(V ε →W ε′ |C)C ≤ Balance(V ε →W ε
′+δ|C)C .
One may use other properties of the theory (like robustness under an approximation structure [1]) to
tighten these bounds further.
Appendix C: Pathological cases
1. Main ideas and statements
Here we aim to get a better understanding of pathological resources, that is resources for which
Balance(V → V |C)C > 0 for some C ∈ C, and see why such resources cannot exist if the currency is
fair. To this end, it is instructive to weaken the definition of currencies by dropping monotonicity of
value, that is, to allow for two currency resources C1 and C2 that C1 → C2 even though ValC1 < ValC2.
This allows us to study more precisely how pathological resources can help us generate more from less
currency and when we may use them — under such a relaxed currency, we may also get resources
V ∈ S for which Cost (V )C < Yield (V )C . In the end, note that we can recover the full order (up
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to equivalences) on the currency by “renormalizing” the value function, that is, by identifying all the
values of inter-convertible currency resources, thus guaranteeing monotonicity of value and eliminating
resources with Cost (V )C < Yield (V )C .
13
We shall now look at the impact of fairness in one or both directions on resources V with
Balance(V → V |C)C > 0
for some C ∈ C, as well as their relation to resources for which Cost (V )C < Yield (V )C . We will also
discuss what happens if we put back in monotonicity of value, and when this leads to a contradiction,
that is, when the theory excludes pathological resources with Balance(V → V |C)C > 0.
a. Fairness in one direction
Good for the rich. In a Stage II currency that is good for the rich, we will see that if there are
resources for which Balance(V → V |C)C > 0, then the theory allows the agent to generate arbitrary
amounts of currency as soon as the agent has access to V and C. More precisely, we can show that
if Balance(V → V |C)C > 0 for some V ∈ S and C ∈ C, the theory essentially becomes trivial after a
threshold of having access to V and C, in the sense that (Proposition C.1)
Balance(V → V |C)C ≈ csup −ValC.
This also means that if we would put back in monotonicity of value at this point (as long as the currency
is not also fair in the other direction, we may do this), we would get that the cost of such a resource V
together with C would essentially have to reach the top of the currency (Proposition C.2),
Cost (V )C & csup −ValC.
This is because when one has enough currency to buy the resource V and still keep the currency C on
the side, then one could generate arbitrary amounts of currency, so the theory needs to make sure that
Cost (V )C +Val(C) essentially already corresponds to the highest possible value in the currency.
Finally, we can also look at how this relates to resources for which Cost (V )C < Yield (V )C (if we were
to allow them). We can show that if the theory is good for the rich, then
Cost (V )C < Yield (V )C =⇒ Balance(V → V |C)C > 0
for all currency resources C ∈ C (Proposition C.3). In particular Balance(V → V |Ω)C > 0, which would
imply that
Yield (V )C ≈ csup.
Good for the poor. When the currency is good for the poor, we can show that a resource for which
Balance(V → V |C)C > 0 for some C ∈ C must also satisfy Yield (V )C > Cost (V )C . Namely, we get from
Balance(V → V |C)C > 0 that (Proposition C.4)
Yield (V )C ≥ Balance(V → V |C)C > 0 = Cost (V )C .
This of course would directly contradict the order on the currency as shown in Proposition A.5, and so
we may not reintroduce monotonicity here without obtaining a contradiction (see below).
b. Fairness in both directions
For a currency that is fair in both directions, we can show that (Corollary C.5)
Cost (V )C < Yield (V )C ⇐⇒ Balance(V → V )C > 0.
13 In fact, monotonicity of value is not essential for most
of the proofs in this paper. We could also start from
a weaker (if less intuitive) definition of currency with-
out a monotonous value, and check when that becomes
relevant.
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If such a resource exists, we furthermore see that the theory becomes essentially trivial, because
Cost (V )C = 0 and Yield (V )C = Balance(V → V )C = csup
for any target resource V ∈ S (Corollary C.6). Since such a theory allows us to generate arbitrary money
for free like king Midas (because in particular Balance(Ω→ Ω)C > 0), we call such a pathological theory
a Midas theory and the resource V a Midas resource.
As fair theories are in particular good for the poor, it is easy to see that we obtain a contradiction
when introducing back the monotonicity on value into the currency. Namely, all currency resources are
inter-convertible, and we would have to set the value of all to be equal — but then we could not get
Cost (V )C > Yield (V )C or Balance(V → V )C > 0 in the first place.
2. Formal statements and proofs
a. Having less does not help (good for the rich)
Proposition C.1 (Pathological case I). Let C be a currency that is fair for the rich. Then, if the theory
has a pathological resource V ∈ S such that Balance(V → V |C)C > 0 for some C ∈ C, then
csup −Val(C) ≥ Balance(V → V |C)C ≥ csup −Val(C)− α
for some margin α that corresponds to the difference between C and the next higher currency resource
C′ a, α = Val(C′)−Val(C).
a if there is no one next higher resource, one can choose a resource arbitrarily close to C
Proof. Let Balance(V → V |C)C > 0. Then for the next higher resource C′ ∈ C 14 with
α := Val(C′)−Val(C) > 0
it holds that
V ∩ C → V ∩ C′.
But then, since the currency is good for the rich, this can be repeated starting from C′ and all higher
values above until we reach the top of the currency (as we can go in steps of α, the top means csup−α),
and so
Balance(V → V |C)C ≥ csup −Val(C)− α.
In the special case where csup =∞, note that by the same rationale as above we can reach any resource
in the currency, and so in this case Balance(V → V |C)C = csup −Val(C) =∞.
Finally, note that the balance starting from C is trivially upper bounded by csup −Val(C) or else one
could exceed the currency limit by performing the operation, that is, trivially
csup −Val(C) ≥ Balance(V → V |C)C .
Proposition C.2 (Cost reaches the top). In a resource theory with a currency C ∈ C that is good for
the rich, a resource V ∈ S such that Balance(V → V |C)C > 0 for some C ∈ C satisfies
Cost (V )C ≥ csup −ValC − β
for some β ≥ α + ε+ ε′ with α as in Proposition C.1 and ε, ε′ ≥ 0 arbitrarily small or zero (depending
on whether or not Cost (V )C and csup are achievable).
14 if there is no one next higher resource, we may choose a resource arbitrarily close to C
32
Proof. Let Cc be a resource such that
Cc → V
and Val(Cc) = Cost (V )C + ε for some arbitrarily small or zero ε ≥ 0, depending on whether or not the
cost of V is achievable. Then, because the theory is fair for the rich, if Val(Cc)+ValC < csup then there
is a resource C′ ∈ C such that
C′ → C ∩ V
and Val(C′) = Val(Cc) + Val(C). But then we can use the fact that
Balance(V → V |C)C ≥ csup −Val(C)− α
to see that (unless csup =∞) then in fact
C′ → V ∩ C → V ∩ C′′
for some C′′ ∈ C satisfying
Val(C′′) ≥ csup − α− ε′
for arbitrarily small or zero ε′ ≥ 0 (depending on whether or not csup is achievable by a currency resource).
But then since in particular C′ → C′′, we must have that Val(C′) ≥ ValC′′ and so Val(C′) ≥ csup−α−ε′.
But then
Cost (V )C + ε+Val(C) = Val(Cc) + Val(C) = Val(C
′) ≥ csup − α− ε′
and so
Cost (V )C ≥ csup −Val(C)− α− ε− ε′.
Finally, if csup = ∞ then it has to be the case that also Cost (V )C = ∞, because otherwise we could
follow the rationale above, and starting from Cc generate arbitrarily large currency values larger than
Val(Cc), which together with the monotonicity of value yields a contradiction.
Proposition C.3 (Resources with smaller cost than yield). In a theory with a currency C that is good
for the rich, for any resource V ∈ S
Cost (V )C < Yield (V )C
=⇒ Balance(V → V |C)C > 0
for all C ∈ C. Furthermore, if Cost (V )C < Yield (V )C , then also
Yield (V )C ≥ csup − α
for α equal to the value of the smallest currency above 0 a.
a if there is no one smallest, we may choose one arbitrarily close to zero
Proof. Let V be a resource such that Cost (V )C < Yield (V )C . Then there are currency resources Cc, Cy ∈C with achievable cost and yield values such that
Cost (V )C ≤ ValCc < ValCy ≤ Yield (V )C
and
Cc → V, V → Cy
are possible processes. But then, because anything that can be done with Cc can still be done with Cy ,
in particular, one can buy V and have some currency resource left over. This means that there is also a
currency resource Cε with ValCε = ε = ValCy −ValCc > 0 such that
V → Cy → V ∩ Cε
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is a possible process.
Then clearly Balance(V → V |Ω)C ≥ ε > 0 and so because the currency is fair for the rich,
Balance(V → V |C)C ≥ ε > 0
for all C ∈ C.
Furthermore, due to Proposition C.1 and Val(Ω) = 0, then in fact
Balance(V → V |Ω)C ≥ csup − α
for α equal to the value of the smallest currency value above 0 (if there is no one smallest, it could be
any arbitrarily small resource). But then
Yield (V )C ≥ Balance(V → V |Ω)C ≥ csup − α.
b. More does not help, fairness for the poor
Proposition C.4 (Pathological case II). Let C be a currency that is fair for the poor. Then for patho-
logical resources V such that Balance(V → V |C)C > 0 for some C ∈ C,
Yield (V )C ≥ Balance(V → V |C)C > 0 = Cost (V )C .
Proof. We will first show that if the currency is good for the poor and Balance(V → V |C)C > 0 for some
C ∈ C, then Cost (V )C = 0.
Namely, let Cc be a currency resource such that Cc → V . But then, if Balance(V → V |C)C > 0 for
some C ∈ C, then also Balance(V → V |Ω)C > 0 due to fairness for the poor. This means that there is a
Cε with ValCε = ε > 0 such that we find
Cc → V → V ∩ Cε.
Hence, because the theory is good for the poor in fact there is a resource C′c ∈ C with ValC′c = ValCc−ε
such that
C′c → V.
We can repeat the argument many times until we reach Val(C′c) < ε. In this case Balance(Ω→ V |C′c)C >
0 and so clearly also Cost (V )C = 0.
To show that Yield (V )C ≥ Balance(V → V |C)C , we again use that Balance(V → V |Ω)C ≥
Balance(V → V |C)C > 0, and also that V → V ∩ C′ is more difficult to perform than V → C′ for
any V and C′ — so trivially Yield (V )C ≥ Balance(V → V |C)C .
c. Both directions
Corollary C.5 (Pathological resources in a Midas theory). In a theory with a fair currency, for any
resource V in the target
Cost (V )C < Yield (V )C ⇐⇒ Balance(V → V )C > 0.
Proof. This follows directly from Propositions C.4 and C.3.
Corollary C.6. In a theory with a fair currency and a Midas resource V , it holds that
Yield (V )C ≥ csup − α
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and
Balance(V → V )C ≥ csup − α
for some margin α that can be chosen as α = ValCα for any currency resource Cα with very small value
(but above zero).
Furthermore, such a theory is essentially trivial in the sense that also
Balance(Ω→ Ω)C ≥ csup − α.
Proof. The first two statements follow immediately from Proposition C.3 and Proposition C.1 by choosing
C = Ω. For the last statement, note that since we can find Cc, Cy ∈ C such that
Cc → V → Cy
with ValCc < ValCy ,
Balance(Ω→ Ω|Cc)C > 0.
But then due to fairness this is true for the unique balance,
Balance(Ω→ Ω)C > 0.
Appendix D: A short note on monotones
The question of whether or not a particular resource can be transformed into another can in general
be difficult to answer. This may already be the case for traditional resource theories, where the task
corresponds to identifying the pre-order on state space, but is even more involved for specifications as
one may have to deal with large sets.
Just like with currencies, often we can decide whether or not V → W more easily by means of
monotones. These are functions on resources that are easy to calculate (otherwise they are not that
useful) and monotonous under→. Then, if a monotonously decreasing function f (such as the free energy
for a thermodynamic process), if f(V ) ≥ f(W ) does not hold, we immediately know that V 9W .
Definition D.1 (Monotones). Let (SΩ, T ) be a resource theory. A monotone is a function M : SΩ → R
such that
V →W =⇒ M(V ) ≥M(W ).
A complete family of monotones is a family of real functions {Mi}i∈I such that
V →W ⇔Mi(V ) ≥Mi(W ).
Note: we could equally have ≤ instead of ≥ in the expressions above.
A complete family of monotones is hence a set of monotones that completely characterizes the pre-
order→. This, however, can in principle be an infinitely large set, and so it is not always a useful means
of deciding whether V →W in the resource theory. Examples of a complete family of monotones would
be the Re´nyi entropies for the trumping relation ≺T or the α-free energies for thermodynamic processes
with exact catalysis [58].
Monotones are related to currencies: if a theory has a currency, Cost (·)C and Yield (·)C are always
monotones (Theorem 1). However, in the other direction not any monotone would constitute a good
characterization of value. This is because the actual numbers assigned through the monotone need not
have any operational significance beyond their monotonicity. For example, intuitively we would expect
that the difference in value of two resources should be linked to a cost of transforming one into the
other: supplying another resource with the missing value should enable an agent to implement the
transformation. We would thus expect a value function to satisfy certain (sub- or super-) additivity
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properties, depending on its exact operational meaning. This is of course not guaranteed for general
monotones.
On the other hand, while currencies ensure an operational meaning of the monotones Cost (·)C and
Yield (·)C , the cost and yield of resources in general do not constitute a complete set of monotones, as
the theory may have a richer structure. If the currency is tight, however, the monotonicity of the cost
of resources actually constitutes a sufficient condition for resource conversion (Theorem 2).
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